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INTRODUCTION 
When reviewing one of the many asylum cases on the Seventh Circuit’s 
docket, Judge Richard Cudahy observed, “While it is distasteful to have to 
quantify suffering for the purposes of determining asylum eligibility, that is our 
task.”1 Prior to this observation in 2003, the federal courts and administrative 
agencies that review immigration matters had already reviewed hundreds of 
thousands (if not millions) of asylum claims.2 In the decade since, hundreds of 
thousands more asylum claims have followed.3 Quantifying harm is a bitter en-
deavor, but the stakes could not be higher for the applicants involved. A deci-
sion of whether harm rises to the level of persecution could mean the difference 
between life and death. Despite the ramifications for asylum seekers, the ap-
proach of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), “which re-
viewing courts have tended to mirror, has continued to be of the ‘I know it 
                                                        
1  Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Abdelmalek v. Mukasey, 
540 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (“It is never a pleasant task to attempt to quantify an individ-
ual’s suffering and measure it against the suffering of others.”). 
2  Chad C. Haddal, Cong. Research Serv., R40133, Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows in 
the United States and Other OECD Member States 18 (2009) (providing asylum statistics 
from 1996 to 2007). 
3  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL 
YEAR BOOK, at I1 (2013) (documenting more than 200,000 asylum cases between fiscal 
years 2008 and 2012); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Asylum Levels and Trends in In-
dustrialized Countries, 2007, at 12 (2008) (stating that 275,960 asylum cases were filed in 
the United States between 2003 and 2007). 
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when I see it’ variety”; EOIR is the immigration agency responsible for adjudi-
cating asylum claims.4 
The difficulties associated with determining when an applicant has been 
persecuted are the result of several converging factors. One, of course, is the 
sheer number of asylum cases. While adjudicators could more readily recog-
nize and deconstruct inconsistencies between dozens of fact patterns, maintain-
ing consistency among thousands of fact-intensive cases is a much harder task.5 
Additionally, despite the volume of adjudicated asylum applications, there 
is still very little guidance on what it means to be persecuted. The Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not define what it means to be persecuted, 
much less the requisite level of harm that rises to the level of persecution.6 Im-
migration regulations also leave undefined the threshold level of suffering an 
applicant must experience to establish persecution.7 Nor has EOIR filled the 
void. Immigration judges adjudicate the applications of asylum seekers who are 
in removal proceedings.8 These immigration judges are part of EOIR, which is 
a component of the U.S. Department of Justice.9 The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“Board”)—also housed within EOIR—reviews appeals of immigra-
tion judges’ decisions.10 Because the U.S. Attorney General appoints Board 
members to act as his or her delegate for the immigration matters the Board re-
views,11 the Board could use its authority to provide guidance on the level of 
harm applicants must suffer to establish they were (or will be) persecuted.12 
The federal appellate courts that review Board decisions would have to apply 
ordinary principles of deference to these general pronouncements.13 The Board, 
however, has been reluctant to define more precisely the requisite harm thresh-
                                                        
4  Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2011). 
5  See Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting the diverse and fact-
intensive nature of persecution inquiries). 
6  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (requiring that an applicant establish persecution with-
out providing further detail); Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 (noting the lack of a statutory defini-
tion). 
7  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2014) (focusing on presumptions regarding future persecution, differ-
ent means of obtaining asylum, and barriers to eligibility). 
8  8 U.S.C. § 1229a (providing the standards that govern removal proceedings). 
9  About the Office, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
10  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (placing the Board under the supervision of the EOIR director); 
id. § 1003.1(b) (reviewing the Board’s jurisdiction to adjudicate appeals of decisions ren-
dered by immigration judges). 
11  Id. § 1003.1(a)(1). 
12  Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Because the word ‘persecution’ 
is not defined by statute, it is in the first instance the prerogative of the Attorney General, 
acting through the [Board], to give content to it.”). 
13  Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2008) (deferring to the Board’s assess-
ment of whether a “categorical application” or “case-by-case review” was preferable under 
the circumstances); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (requiring the 
appellate court to apply “the principles of deference described in Chevron” because the case 
implicated the Board’s “construction of the statute which it administers”). 
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old for a finding of persecution.14 As a result of the Board’s lack of guidance, 
the appellate courts that review Board decisions necessarily play a larger role in 
determining this requisite threshold.15 
The heightened role of reviewing courts has significantly contributed to the 
current problems associated with measuring whether harm is persecutory. Ap-
pellate courts review thousands of immigration cases every year and nearly half 
of those cases concern asylum.16 If an applicant wishes to challenge the 
Board’s asylum denial, the appeal goes directly to the federal appellate court 
that has jurisdiction over the geographic area where the immigration judge ini-
tially adjudicated the asylum application.17 The party filing the appeal will al-
ways be the applicant because the Attorney General will not appeal the decision 
of the very adjudicatory body it delegated to decide immigration matters.18 
Immigration courts are spread throughout the geographic boundaries of all non-
specialized appellate courts except for the D.C. Circuit.19 Consequently, eleven 
different appellate courts independently pass judgment on EOIR’s assessments 
of whether harm rises to the level of persecution—a significant number of 
spoons stirring the persecution pot. 
                                                        
14  See Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (remarking how the Board has 
decided that persecution “is best addressed on a case-by-case basis”); Marquez v. INS, 105 
F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The prevailing approach is, perhaps unfortunately, largely ad 
hoc.”). The most notable exception to the Board’s ad hoc approach to persecutory harm as-
sessments concerns China’s coercive population control policies. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) 
(2012) (“For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced to 
abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for 
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population 
control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion 
. . . .”); see also, e.g., In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 633 (B.I.A. 2008) (discussing 
the forcible insertion of intrauterine devices); In re J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (B.I.A. 2007) 
(discussing the impact of family planning policies when an applicant’s children were born in 
China). 
15  Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Responsibility has by default 
devolved on the courts . . . to try to create some minimum coherence in the adjudication of 
claims of persecution . . . .”); see also Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 681 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“The definition of persecution that our court applies is a creature of purely our own 
case law.”). 
16  See, e.g., John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2011 and Calen-
dar Year 2011 Totals, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2012, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Guendelsberger, 
2011 Asylum Statistics] (noting that 1,517 of the 3,123 immigration appeals adjudicated in 
2011 concerned asylum matters); John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for Decem-
ber 2012 and Calendar Year 2012 Totals, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2013, at 4, 4 [hereinaf-
ter Guendelsberger, 2012 Asylum Statistics] (noting that 1,292 of the 2,711 immigration ap-
peals adjudicated in 2012 concerned asylum matters). 
17  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (discussing jurisdiction); id. § 1252(b)(2) (discussing venue). 
18  Rather, if the Attorney General disagrees with the Board, the Attorney General could cer-
tify the question to himself or herself. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2014). 
19  See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (re-
viewing the location of immigration courts). 
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To be sure, the appellate courts must defer to EOIR’s assessment of wheth-
er a set of harms establishes persecution.20 But individual persecutory harm in-
quiries are typically treated by the courts as questions of fact.21 Consequently, 
even though courts defer to EOIR’s largely ad hoc persecution assessment in 
any given case, in the absence of generally applicable harm standards from the 
Board, the courts almost always have the liberty to determine just how severe 
an applicant’s circumstances must be to necessarily cross the persecution 
threshold—that is, to determine whether EOIR erred by finding that a set of 
harms failed to establish persecution.22 Courts’ modus operandi is simply to 
compare and contrast to previous persecution cases.23 And due to differing 
opinions on what the harm threshold should be, panels are free to emphasize or 
deemphasize any factual nuance they choose between the cases that they are 
reviewing and previous cases they have decided.24 
While courts sometimes express frustration that there exists no uniform 
standard to determine when harm rises to the level of persecution, EOIR and 
the appellate courts are largely in the dark about the current state of persecution 
jurisprudence.25 Scholarship up to this point has not undertaken a comprehen-
sive assessment of the true extent of inconsistencies among persecution deci-
sions, much less evaluated what the current state of affairs illustrates about the 
proper way to evaluate harm and foster a more uniform standard.26 As Judge 
                                                        
20  Alvarado-Carillo v. INS, 251 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2001) (reciting the oft-repeated defer-
ential standard). 
21  Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that both past and prospec-
tive persecution findings are “factual determinations”). 
22  See infra Part III.B (dissecting the extent of differing harm thresholds among the re-
viewed appellate courts). 
23  See, e.g., Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899, 910 (9th Cir. 2013) (comparing and con-
trasting to previous cases that concerned physical abuse); Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 
976 (10th Cir. 2011) (reviewing other cases involving Christian Indonesian asylum appli-
cants). 
24  Compare Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Susanto v. Gon-
zales, 439 F.3d 57, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2006) for the proposition that “physical abuse does not 
necessarily prove persecution”), with Chanchavac v. INS, 207 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999) to explain that “we 
have ‘consistently found persecution where, as here, the petitioner was physically 
harmed.’ ”). 
25  See Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the situation as 
“capricious adjudication at both the administrative and judicial level, generating extraordi-
nary variance both in grants of asylum in similar cases at the administrative level and in re-
versals by courts of appeals of denials”); Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 
2004) (lamenting that “decisions often seem to point in opposite directions on relatively sim-
ilar facts”). 
26  Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag surveyed the asylum jurisprudence of 
the appellate courts over a two-year period. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 361–71 (2007) (reviewing deci-
sions from 2004 and 2005). Due to the voluminous number of decisions that their ground-
breaking study entailed—agency decisions as well as appellate court decisions—they were 
unable to assess each of the reasons why an appellate court did or did not decide to remand 
15 NEV. L.J. 142 - REMPELL.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
Fall 2014] ASYLUM DISCORD 147 
Reena Raggi observed, however, “[a] rational system of law would seem to re-
quire consistent treatment of [comparable or] identical claims.”27 
This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. The subject of this article 
is a study reviewing appellate courts’ persecution inquiries over seventeen 
years, 1996 through 2013, since the appellate courts began serving as the de 
facto final arbiters of whether harm rises to the level of persecution. As previ-
ously noted, certain features of appellate courts’ review methods have contrib-
uted to the current problem. Nevertheless, a particular aspect of the standard of 
review applicable to administrative findings of fact, such as persecution as-
sessments, can help provide a greater understanding of how decisionmakers 
gauge persecution.28 In 1996, Congress amended the INA to codify the great 
deference afforded to EOIR’s findings of fact.29 Now, persecution determina-
tions are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”30 The appellate courts have interpreted this standard 
to mean that they can only reverse the Board if a determination that the appli-
cant was persecuted is the only possible result.31 Thus, this aspect of the stand-
ard of review provides an opening to isolate, explore, and compare those lim-
ited circumstances where an appellate court has held that a set of facts 
necessarily establishes that an applicant has been persecuted. 
After a brief overview of asylum law and the adjudication process in Part I, 
Part II reviews the methodology this study used to identify the cases that depict 
per se persecutory conduct. The study focuses on asylum claims rather than ap-
plications for refugee relief because of the availability and sheer volume of ma-
terial.32 The persecution inquiry, however, should be identical in both asylum 
and refugee claims; the central distinction between the two forms of relief is the 
                                                                                                                                
an asylum claim, much less isolate those cases that addressed the persecution component of 
the refugee definition. Id. 
27  Zhang v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2006). 
28  See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309–10 (1955) (holding that the INA supersedes 
the APA’s hearing provisions). 
29  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to -612 (amending INA § 242). 
30  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
31  See, e.g., Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the record 
evidence compels the result that we have reached, then no alternative determination is possi-
ble.”). 
32  OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 39 (2012) (noting that since 1980, more than 2,600,000 refugees 
have been admitted into the United States). While the Department of Justice adjudicates asy-
lum applications filed during removal proceedings, the refugee process involves a number of 
domestic agencies and NGOs collectively working to steer prospective refugees through the 
process. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration oversees 
the U.S. Resettlement Program. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services interviews the 
prospective refugees who make it through an arduous screening process. Refugee Eligibility 
Determination, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC- 
URITY, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/refugee-eligibility-deter 
mination (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
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location of the applicant at the time he or she applies.33 As to asylum inquiries, 
there are countless reasons why an appellate court might choose to affirm or 
remand a Board decision. Consequently, Part II explains how this study sifted 
through the case law haystack to pinpoint the needles that collectively depict 
the parameters of what various courts have construed as necessarily persecutory 
conduct. For example, in many cases, an appellate court will remand the 
Board’s persecution holding because EOIR erred in its decision-making pro-
cess—by failing to articulate the justification for its conclusion or overlooking 
relevant evidence.34 These process flaws must be distinguished from their mer-
its cohorts even though the courts fail to consistently appreciate the distinc-
tion.35 
The findings of this study are the subject of Part III. The results depict sev-
eral threshold levels of suffering that the examined courts all agree necessarily 
establish persecutory conduct. It is important to review the areas of agreement 
because these universally accepted severity thresholds provide the foundation 
from which to build. Aside from the obvious importance of reporting accurate 
findings, an exclusive focus on assessment inconsistencies would not be fair to 
appellate court adjudicators who have had the fateful and unenviable task of 
reviewing these fact-intensive persecution claims for decades. 
Nevertheless, despite these areas of agreement, this study documented an 
unequivocal chasm in the consistency of persecution decisions that do not fall 
within one of the universally accepted categories. The remainder of Part III 
delves into the divergences. For example, the results illustrate how a one-day 
detention involving electric shock compelled a finding of persecution,36 while a 
ten-day detention involving electric shock did not.37 Similarly, while several 
weeks of psychological suffering necessarily established persecution,38 several 
years of even greater psychological suffering failed to cross the persecution 
threshold.39 
Part IV explores the potential causes of these incredible divergences in per-
secution outcomes. A review of the data reveals that asylum applicants’ ability 
to avoid deportation may depend on the appellate court jurisdiction they happen 
to fall under or even the particular judges within a given circuit that happen to 
                                                        
33  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (allowing an individual to apply for asylum relief if the individual 
is “physically present in the United States”); id. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (requiring that asylum ap-
plicants satisfy the definition of a “refugee”). 
34  See Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing 
decisionmaking flaws that include “flawed reasoning” and “a sufficiently flawed fact-finding 
process”). 
35  Compare Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 722–23 (7th Cir. 1998) (remanding for deficiencies 
in the Board’s decisionmaking standard), with Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (construing the facts in Asani as conclusively persecutory). 
36  Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 2005). 
37  Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 575–77 (1st Cir. 2008). 
38  Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2004). 
39  Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 932–33, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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be assigned to their case. Appellate courts’ persecution jurisprudence also 
makes clear that the staggering inconsistencies between these persecution deci-
sions are caused by disparities in how courts assess and measure harm. Part IV 
identifies and discusses the problems with courts’ current persecution inquiries, 
and provides several preliminary observations to remedy the current state of 
affairs. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. THE LAW OF ASYLUM 
After the United States acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees,40 Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 198041 to 
give statutory commitment to its human rights obligations.42 As interpreted and 
amended over the last three decades, the Refugee Act provides the substantive 
requirements that applicants must satisfy to obtain asylum relief.43 The Refugee 
Act, subsequent amendments to the INA, and immigration regulations prescribe 
the process applicants must follow to obtain asylum relief.44 
A. Substantive Law 
Asylum claims require that the applicant satisfy the definition of a “refu-
gee.”45 Three core elements comprise the refugee definition: a well-founded 
fear of persecution, a nexus between the harm and a protected ground, and gov-
ernment involvement or abdication to the harm.46 To establish a well-founded 
fear of persecution, applicants must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that 
harm will befall them if they are deported to their home country.47 The harm 
must be severe enough to rise to the level of persecution, but it can take many 
forms. Physical abuse, economic harm, and impediments to religious practice 
                                                        
40  Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968). 
41  Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
42  S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1, 6 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141, 146–47. 
43  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (statutory definition of a refugee); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13 (2014) (asylum regulations). 
44  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (discussing the structure of a hearing before an immigration 
judge); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (describing the appeals process to the Board). 
45  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
46  Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (b)(2)(i) (mandating that applicants estab-
lish these three core elements in past persecution and well-founded fear of persecution 
claims, respectively); see Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (assessing the 
nexus requirement); Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing the appli-
cant’s need to establish the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect the applicant 
from private actors). 
47  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431–32, 450 (1987) (discussing the requisite 
probability of ten percent as the likelihood of persecution that may be sufficient). 
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are but a few examples.48 As the “well-founded fear” language makes clear, 
persecution decisions are, for the most part, ultimately forward-looking.49 Gov-
ernments willing to provide asylum protection do so to ensure that applicants 
do not suffer future persecution as a result of being deported. 
Even though applicants must ultimately demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
persecution, their past experiences are relevant in two ways. For one, these past 
experiences can help to prove that their fear of persecution in the future is well-
founded.50 Indeed, under many circumstances, one can infer that an applicant 
previously harmed by a regime that remains in power may be harmed again. 
Additionally—and more importantly for purposes of this article—past harm 
may create a presumption that the applicant will be harmed in the future.51 Spe-
cifically, if applicants can establish that they experienced harm that rose to the 
level of persecution (along with the other two core elements), then they are en-
titled to a rebuttable presumption that they have a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.52 Because the rebuttable presumption puts the onus on the government to 
disprove the well-founded fear, many asylum cases hinge on these past perse-
cution findings.53 
In addition to establishing a well-founded fear of persecution, applicants 
cannot satisfy the refugee definition unless they show that the harm feared (or 
already experienced to receive the presumption) would be dispensed on account 
of one of five protected grounds.54 The protected grounds are race, religion, na-
tionality, political opinion, and social group.55 Consequently, applicants who 
fear the government will harm them because of their religious beliefs can satis-
fy this nexus requirement. Conversely, applicants asserting that they fear ban-
dits will rob them to obtain money cannot establish the requisite nexus because 
the thieves’ motive for the robbery is simply financial gain.56 
The third central element of the refugee definition concerns the role of the 
State in perpetrating the harm. Applicants satisfy this element if the govern-
                                                        
48  See Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 292–310 (providing a 
taxonomy of harm). 
49  As noted subsequently, there are limited exceptions when an applicant experiences past 
harm that is severe enough to establish eligibility for asylum relief in the absence of a fear of 
future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). 
50  See Boykov v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining how “unfulfilled 
threats” can be “viewed as indicative of the danger of future persecution”). 
51  Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 2004); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 
191 F.3d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 1999). 
52  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). 
53  The importance of past persecution findings are also readily apparent when reviewing ap-
pellate courts’ reluctance to find that the government rebutted the presumption of future per-
secution. See, e.g., Mihaylov v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (faulting the agen-
cy’s changed country conditions analysis). 
54  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
55  Id. 
56  See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing random 
harm from harm perpetrated on account of a protected ground). 
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ment, or an arm of the State, is responsible for the harm.57 If, however, private 
actors are the alleged perpetrators, then applicants must show that the govern-
ment is either unable or unwilling to protect them.58 
Aside from these main elements of the refugee definition, the INA and 
immigration regulations provide additional barriers for applicants seeking asy-
lum. For example, applicants may not be granted asylum if they could avoid 
future harm by relocating to a different part of their home country.59 Addition-
ally, applicants are often not permitted to even apply for asylum unless they file 
their applications within one year of entering the United States.60 Further, under 
the so-called “persecutor bar,” applicants cannot obtain asylum if they perse-
cuted others.61 
Mitigating slightly these asylum relief hurdles, immigration law broadens 
in several ways the circumstances under which applicants can obtain asylum. 
For one, applicants can still be eligible for humanitarian asylum relief in the ab-
sence of a well-founded fear of future persecution if the past harm experienced 
was incredibly severe.62 Additionally, even if applicants cannot show that they 
will be singled out for persecution upon return to their home country, regula-
tions deem sufficient a pattern or practice of persecution against a group to 
which the applicants belong.63 
Thus, there are many circumstances that adjudicators must take into ac-
count when assessing the viability of an asylum claim. One certainty, however, 
is that applicants cannot obtain asylum relief unless they establish the requisite 
persecution. The harm assessments reviewed in this study represent the central 
component of what it means to be persecuted, and persecution is the “funda-
mental concept at the core of the refugee definition.”64 
B. The Asylum Process 
Asylum seekers may file applications affirmatively or defensively. An ap-
plication is affirmative when the applicant files it before the government places 
him or her in removal proceedings.65 If the applicant seeks asylum after the 
                                                        
57  Vahora v. Holder, 707 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2013). 
58  Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013) (reviewing whether the 
Peruvian government was able to protect the applicant against the Shining Path guerrilla or-
ganization). 
59  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (2014). 
60  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D) (barring late-filed applications in the absence of a change in 
circumstance). Applicants do not face a similar time limitation when they apply for with-
holding of removal. See id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
61  Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (persecutor bar provision); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 
511 (2009) (analyzing the persecutor bar). 
62  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (B.I.A. 1989) 
(providing the subsequently codified humanitarian asylum standard). 
63  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(B). 
64  In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 167 (B.I.A. 2007). 
65  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a). 
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government places him or her in a removal proceeding, then the application is 
considered defensive.66 
For affirmative applications, the applicant files the claim with the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s Asylum Office.67 If the asylum officer does not 
grant the applicant’s claim, the case is referred to the immigration courts 
housed within EOIR.68 At this point, the applicant is in a position comparable 
to those who file defensive applications. The applicant then has a hearing be-
fore an immigration judge. The INA and immigration regulations govern im-
migration judges’ authority and the nature of the proceeding, but the adjudica-
tion process is comparable to many other administrative hearings.69 In contrast 
to the interview with an asylum officer, the administrative hearing is more for-
mal and adversarial; the parties submit relevant documentation, call witnesses 
to testify, and cross-examine the opposing parties’ witnesses.70 
If the immigration judge denies the asylum application, the applicant can 
appeal to the Board.71 From there, an applicant can appeal the Board’s decision 
directly to the federal court of appeals sitting in the applicable venue, which is 
based on the location of the immigration court that adjudicated the applicant’s 
case.72 As mentioned previously, it will always be the asylum applicant who 
appeals a Board decision because the Department of Justice will not try to over-
turn a decision rendered by the administrative appellate body that the Attorney 
General designated to determine such matters.73 The First through Eleventh 
Circuits all review Board decisions.74 While an applicant may petition the Su-
preme Court for certiorari, for all intents and purposes the courts of appeals 
have the last say with respect to persecution assessments.75 
                                                        
66  See id. § 208.2(b). 
67  Id. § 208.9; see also Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual (AAPM) 4–33 (2013) (de-
scribing each step of the affirmative asylum application process). 
68  8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)–(c); see also Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (providing an overview of the immigration courts). 
69  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012) (reviewing the procedures that govern removal hearings); 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.1(a) (discussing the authority of immigration judges). 
70  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b). 
71  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (discussing the Board’s appellate jurisdiction); id. § 1003.3 (describ-
ing the procedures to appeal to the Board). 
72  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (providing appellate courts with exclusive jurisdiction over asylum 
appeals of Board decisions); id. § 1252(b)(2) (discussing venue). 
73  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (providing a fifteen-member Board with authority to act on behalf 
of the Attorney General). 
74  See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 19 (providing immigration court loca-
tions that do not include the District of Columbia). 
75  While the fact-heavy nature of typical persecution inquiries does not ordinarily garner 
Supreme Court attention, the Court has passed judgment on the requisite likelihood that ap-
plicants will be persecuted if returned to their home countries. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 431–32, 450 (1987) (finding that an applicant does not have to show a proba-
bility of persecution to qualify as an asylee); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984) 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This study sought to identify cases that adjudicators have found to neces-
sarily establish persecution. Identifying such cases permits an assessment of 
any agreed upon harm thresholds. It also illuminates any divergent holdings 
concerning what it means to be persecuted. To identify these cases, Part II first 
explains why certain appellate court holdings establish necessarily persecutory 
conduct. It will then review the initial asylum case pool that contained the ger-
mane persecution assessments. The initial case pool, however, also included 
numerous cases that did not pertain to this article’s ultimate inquiry. Accord-
ingly, Part II will review how this study categorized and eliminated the cases 
that did not determine whether a set of harms necessarily established persecu-
tion. A discussion of the final case sample follows. 
A. Using Standards of Review to Isolate Persecution’s Threshold 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires courts to apply the 
substantial evidence standard of review to an agency’s findings of fact in a 
formal proceeding.76 Immigration proceedings, however, are governed by the 
INA rather than the APA.77 Nevertheless, the two statutes’ procedural require-
ments share many similarities because Congress modeled the INA’s hearing 
provisions on the APA.78 The INA previously provided that the agency’s find-
ings of fact are conclusive “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on the record considered as a whole.”79 The courts almost univer-
sally interpreted this provision to require them to apply the traditional 
substantial evidence standard of review to factual findings, such as the harm 
required to establish persecution.80 Such interpretations were well-grounded, as 
the substantial evidence review standard requires appellate courts to assess 
whether such evidence exists that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.”81 Under the familiar principles of Universal Camera, 
courts review the reasonableness of the agency’s determination against the 
                                                                                                                                
(holding that an applicant must show persecution is “more likely than not” to qualify for 
withholding of deportation). 
76  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
77  See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (finding that the APA does not govern 
immigration hearings); Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that 
court review of the Board’s deportation orders are exempt from the APA). 
78  Marcello, 349 U.S. at 307–08 (noting that the APA served as a model for the INA). 
79  8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994). 
80  Melendez v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 216–17 (2d Cir. 1991) (pointing to the 
Third Circuit as the only circuit to unambiguously employ an abuse of discretion standard of 
review); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Re-
view, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 764 (2008) (contending that substantial evidence and arbitrary 
and capricious review are “essentially the same”). 
81  Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also David Zaring, Reasona-
ble Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 147–50 (2010) (discussing the reasonableness standard for 
findings of fact). 
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backdrop of the administrative record as a whole.82 Substantial evidence review 
is incredibly deferential,83 although the extent of deference—like most aspects 
of agency review standards—has been the subject of differing opinions.84 
For many immigration issues, the way appellate courts characterize their 
standard of review for factual findings, such as persecution, changed in 1992 
when the Supreme Court decided INS v. Elias-Zacarias.85 In Elias-Zacarias, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, observed in a footnote, “[t]o reverse the 
[Board’s] finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclu-
sion, but compels it.”86 From this off-the-cuff observation—which was merely 
a response to an argument made by the dissent—came a 1996 amendment to 
the INA that essentially codified this footnote as the standard of review for fac-
tual findings in immigration proceedings. Specifically, the INA now states, “the 
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”87 
Elias-Zacarias and Congress might have intended to alter the previously-
applied substantial evidence standard of review or they merely could have been 
paraphrasing the standard’s core reasonableness requirement. Regardless of 
their intention, supplementing the standard of review with a phrase couched in 
negative rather than positive terms has affected how appellate courts interpret 
their review standard. The way the Seventh Circuit phrased its review standard 
in Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft is illustrative of how appellate courts now apply 
the codified standard of review for findings of fact: “[I]f the record evidence 
compels the result that we have reached, then no alternative determination is 
possible.”88 The case law is replete with comparable descriptions among the 
appellate courts.89 As a result of the way courts generally assess factual find-
ings, when an appellate court reverses a persecution determination because the 
                                                        
82  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951). 
83  Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 
1026–27 (11th Cir. 2004). 
84  See Tex. World Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 928 F.2d 1426, 1430 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing the 
difficulties applying the substantial evidence standard); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the 
Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2011) (re-
viewing empirical studies on courts’ application of the six administrative law doctrines). 
85  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
86  Id. at 481 n.1. 
87  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
88  Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004) (second emphasis added). 
89  See, e.g., Dong v. Holder, 696 F.3d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[R]eversal is appropriate 
only when the record evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached 
by the [Board].” (quoting Ruiz v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2008))). Given this in-
credibly deferential standard, it is not surprising that several decisions equate a reversal to a 
finding of persecution as a matter of law. Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 
2006) (analyzing whether “the circumstances [rose] to the level of past persecution as a mat-
ter of law”); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he question reduces 
to whether, given those facts, the [Board] was compelled, as a matter of law, to find that the 
petitioner had established . . . persecution.”). 
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record compels a contrary conclusion, then the court is holding that the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from the record is that the harms alleged by the 
applicant establish persecutory conduct.90 Consequently, the current standard of 
review can be employed as a vehicle to isolate the cases that elucidate neces-
sarily persecutory conduct.91 The cases depicting per se persecutory conduct 
are the ones that this study sought to ultimately identify. Classifying such cases 
will permit this study to assess the level of harm that courts believe are unques-
tionably sufficient to establish persecution, as well as any inconsistencies in 
courts’ persecution holdings. With this threshold goal in mind, the remainder of 
Part II will review how this study sifted through the myriad asylum cases adju-
dicated in the courts of appeals to find the decisions that squarely addressed 
whether a set of harms necessarily established persecution. 
B. The Initial Scope of Cases Reviewed 
As previously noted, the First through Eleventh Circuits review asylum ap-
peals from Board decisions. This study chose four circuit courts to evaluate: the 
First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth. The Second and Ninth Circuits were chosen 
because they hear the vast majority of immigration appeals filed in federal 
court;92 asylum cases make up roughly half of all immigration appeals.93 Of the 
approximately twenty-seven thousand immigration cases adjudicated by federal 
appellate courts from 2006 to 2011, for example, the Second and Ninth Circuits 
adjudicated roughly two-thirds of them.94 This study chose to include cases ad-
judicated by the First and Seventh Circuits because decisions from these cir-
cuits are representative of the outer parameters of appellate court remand rates 
for asylum cases. Historically, the Seventh Circuit has one of the highest re-
mand rates while the First Circuit has one of the lowest.95 
                                                        
90  The findings of EOIR that courts construe as questions of fact ordinarily include both the 
allegations of what happened to the applicant and the ultimate determination of whether 
those facts establish persecution. 
91  Kumar v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 2006) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (noting 
the court’s need to interpret whether a set of facts “necessarily constitute[] persecution”). 
92  Guendelsberger, 2011 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
93  See, e.g., Guendelsberger, 2012 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 4–5 (noting that 1,292 
of the 2,711 immigration appeals adjudicated in 2012 concerned asylum matters); Guendels-
berger, 2011 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 4–5 (noting that 1,517 of the 3,123 immi-
gration appeals adjudicated in 2011 concerned asylum matters). 
94  Guendelsberger, 2012 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 4–5; Guendelsberger, 2011 
Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 4–5; see also Virtual Law Library: Immigration Law Ad-
visor, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/lib_ila.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) 
(providing comparable annual statistics from 2006 through 2013). 
95  Guendelsberger, 2012 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16, at 5. From 2006 through 2012, the 
Seventh Circuit’s average remand rate was 19.2 percent. Id. The average remand rate for the 
First Circuit during this time period was 8.4 percent. Id. While several appellate courts have 
remand rates as low, or slightly lower, than the First Circuit, id., the First Circuit’s assess-
ment methodology of potentially persecutory conduct sets it apart from many other cir-
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The sampling of cases within these four circuits was further narrowed in 
several ways. First, unpublished cases were excluded to ensure the study only 
encompassed binding precedent of persecution assessments. Additionally, the 
study limited the evaluated cases to those decided during or after 1996. Be-
cause 1996 was the year when Congress codified the Elias-Zacarias standard 
of review for findings of fact,96 almost entirely limiting the case pool to those 
cases adjudicated after the codification date diminishes the likelihood that the 
cases will assess persecution findings under a standard that deviates from the 
one courts currently employ.97 
Narrowed by the aforementioned criteria, the study used a WestlawNext 
advanced search to generate a list of cases that mention the words “persecut!”98 
and “asylum.” This search generated a necessarily over-inclusive list that pro-
vided the foundation for additional refinement. At this stage, the results yielded 
approximately nine hundred cases. 
C. Further Narrowing the Case Sample 
A significant challenge for this study was to isolate those cases where the 
courts assessed whether a set of harms necessarily rose to the level of persecu-
tion—and whether courts did so in a manner that illuminates the requisite level 
of harm they believe applicants must show to establish persecution. While the 
approximately nine hundred cases generated in the initial search all mentioned 
“asylum” and a derivation of “persecution,” most of these decisions did not en-
gage in the persecution assessment this study sought to isolate. Consequently, 
the study had to examine each of these cases to eliminate the ones that were not 
instructive. For many of these cases, there are straightforward reasons why they 
were not useful, such as decisions where persecution was not discussed because 
applicants waived the issue.99 As this section will review, however, the study 
eliminated other decisions from the final case pool for reasons that are less ap-
parent; for this reason, a more detailed justification for excluding them is war-
                                                                                                                                
cuits—a point discussed further infra Part IV. Thus, this study also included cases from the 
First Circuit so that the sample is reflective of the range of assessment methodologies ap-
plied throughout the appellate courts when they determine whether conduct rises to the level 
of persecution. 
96  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA], Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-608; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012) 
(codification of amendment to INA § 242). 
97  The study does include several cases that courts issued in the months preceding IIRIRA’s 
enactment. These cases, however, employ language comparable to the codified standard. 
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Matamoros v. INS, 86 F.3d 158, 160 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “any 
reasonable factfinder” would reach a contrary conclusion); Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 
910 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the record compelled a contrary conclusion). 
98  The “!” root expander generates results that include derivations of “persecut,” such as 
persecute, persecuted, and persecution. 
99  E.g., Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (waiver of past persecu-
tion). 
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ranted.100 In all, approximately seven hundred cases from the initial case pool 
of nine hundred were eliminated.101 This study documented no fewer than thirty 
bases for court actions on asylum cases that led to the elimination of these sev-
en hundred cases.102 These approximately thirty bases can be broken down into 
five categories that will now be reviewed in turn. 
1. Elements or Requirements Other than Persecutory Harm Assessments 
Many asylum cases focus on elements of the refugee definition other than 
persecution. Thus, irrelevant to this study are decisions based on the nexus re-
quirement103 and those that focus on whether the government was (or will be) 
either responsible for the harm or unable or unwilling to protect the applicant 
from the harms perpetrated by private actors.104 If the appellate court’s decision 
rendered ambiguous the specific element forming the basis of the decision, then 
it was omitted from consideration.105 
Aside from the core elements of the refugee definition, asylum law pro-
vides additional eligibility requirements. Decisions based on any of these addi-
tional requirements were also discarded. These excluded categories of cases in-
clude: whether the applicant resettled in a third country prior to arriving in the 
                                                        
100  See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the need to exclude most decisions that were based on 
whether an applicant established a well-founded fear of persecution). 
101  See Supplement Schedule S6, at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/, for a rep-
resentative sample of the seven hundred eliminated cases. I did not record each case that fell 
within each category once I amassed a core set of examples that illustrate the basis for elimi-
nating cases that fell within a given category. I approximated the eliminated cases at seven 
hundred by taking the number of cases generated by the initial search—approximately nine 
hundred—and subtracting the approximately two hundred cases, see infra Part II.D, where 
the court did specifically assess whether the harm alleged by the applicant compelled the 
conclusion that the applicant was persecuted. The appendix includes a comprehensive list of 
the cases in which the court determined whether the record compelled the conclusion that 
assailants persecuted the applicant. 
102  Cases do not necessarily fall exclusively into one category. For example, a court may 
premise its holding on the applicant’s failure to negate that there has been a fundamental 
change in circumstances in the applicant’s home country while also determining that the ap-
plicant is not eligible for humanitarian asylum. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 
n.9 (2d Cir. 2010); Waweru v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 199, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). 
103  E.g., Regalado-Escobar v. Holder, 717 F.3d 724, 728, 730 (9th Cir. 2013); Sugiarto v. 
Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 2009). 
104  E.g., Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the government unwill-
ing or unable to control the persecutory actions of non-governmental assailants); Khan v. 
Holder, 727 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that government setbacks do not necessarily 
equate to an inability to protect). 
105  In many cases, a court will discuss multiple elements concurrently and phrase its holding 
in a manner that leaves open to interpretation whether the ultimate holding is based on one or 
two elements. See, e.g., Uwais v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 513, 518–19 (2d Cir. 2007) (re-
viewing errors in both the persecution and nexus elements); Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 
767 (7th Cir. 2007) (same). 
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United States,106 whether the applicant could safely reside in a different area of 
the home country,107 whether a change in country conditions negated any fear 
the applicant might reasonably harbor,108 whether the applicant’s claim was 
credible,109 whether the applicant adequately corroborated the asylum claim,110 
and whether the applicant was barred from applying for asylum because he or 
she failed to timely file the application.111 
In its asylum decisions, EOIR often provided multiple reasons for denying 
a claim where one of the reasons for the denial hinged on a persecution assess-
ment. In several instances, however, an appellate court declined to review the 
persecution assessment because it believed that the erroneous aspects of 
EOIR’s decision necessarily infected the persecution finding.112 As a result of 
appellate courts’ failure to review such persecution determinations on the mer-
its, these cases were omitted as well. 
Finally, because asylum determinations are technically discretionary, an 
immigration judge can deny in his or her discretion an applicant’s claim even if 
the applicant is statutorily eligible for asylum.113 While such denials are rare, 
                                                        
106  E.g., Liao v. Holder, 558 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding the agency erroneously 
concluded that the applicant had firmly resettled); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c)(2)(i)(B), 
1208.15 (2014) (defining firm resettlement and prohibiting a grant of asylum to applicants 
who have firmly resettled). 
107  E.g., Khan, 727 F.3d at 9 (finding the applicant failed to prove he could not internally 
relocate within Pakistan); Cardenas v. INS, 294 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the 
agency erred when it determined that the applicant could reside safely in a different part of 
Peru); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (stating that an applicant’s ability to relocate 
is a basis to deny an asylum claim). 
108  E.g., Mihaylov v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (remanding for deficiencies 
in the decisionmaking process and a faulty changed country conditions analysis); Toptchev 
v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding a change in country conditions even if 
past persecution were presumed); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (stating that a 
“fundamental change in circumstances” can support a denial of asylum relief). 
109  E.g., Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2007); Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 
942, 943 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012) (codified credibility 
standards). 
110  E.g., Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2008); Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 
F.3d 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (codified corroboration 
standards). 
111  E.g., Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 321–22 (2d Cir. 2006) (assessing 
whether the court had jurisdiction to consider an exception to the one-year filing require-
ment); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (prohibiting untimely applications unless an excep-
tion applies). 
112  E.g., Huang v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (faulting the Board for 
conflating adverse credibility with a decision on the merits); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
687, 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining that an erroneous credibility determination infected 
the agency’s persecution finding). 
113  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). Asylum is discretionary because the relief provides the ap-
plicant with an opportunity to subsequently obtain permanent resident status. Nevertheless, 
asylees are ordinarily entitled to withholding of removal under the INA, which is mandatory 
but does not provide comparable adjustment of status opportunities. See INS v. Cardoza-
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this study omitted appeals that hinged solely on the discretionary component 
because the reviewing court does not consider whether a set of harms necessari-
ly rises to the level of persecution.114 
2. Vague or Non-Binding Harm Determinations 
Some opinions that expressly held that an applicant established past perse-
cution failed to provide any indication of the harms that formed the basis for 
the conclusion.115 Such opinions were discounted because they provide no in-
herent value to gauging what conduct constitutes persecution. In addition to 
ambiguous holdings, this study also omitted from consideration harm assess-
ments that were merely dicta. In numerous cases, the appellate courts discussed 
in passing whether the alleged harms rose to the level of persecution, but their 
ultimate holdings were based on a different asylum element.116 Similarly, re-
gardless of its once binding effect, a persecution assessment loses its utility 
when a court subsequently vacates the opinion.117 For its comparable non-
definitive effect, this study also discounted cases where the agency assumed 
arguendo that assailants persecuted the applicant.118 Such assumptions negate 
the appellate courts’ need to determine whether the experienced harm neces-
sarily established persecution. 
3. Decisions that Use Different Standards of Assessment 
Due to differing standards of assessment, decisions are largely unhelpful in 
discerning the threshold for persecutory conduct when they derive from mo-
tions to reopen, address the persecutor bar, or, to a large extent, when they con-
cern humanitarian asylum or are exclusively based on whether an applicant’s 
fear of being persecuted is well-founded. When applicants file motions to reo-
pen based on asylum claims, they merely need to prove that their claims are 
“plausible,” demonstrate the existence of a decisionmaking error, or otherwise 
establish an abuse of agency discretion.119 As such, the appellate courts need 
                                                                                                                                
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.6 (1987) (reviewing the distinctions between asylum and statu-
tory withholding of deportation). 
114  E.g., Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004). 
115  E.g., Astrero v. INS, 104 F.3d 264, 265–66 (9th Cir. 1996); Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 
F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116  E.g., Kadia v. Holder, 557 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the conduct alleged 
“would seem to establish harm above the level of mere harassment”); Mukamusoni v. Ash-
croft, 390 F.3d 110, 120 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that the record would likely compel a perse-
cution finding if the agency had found the applicant credible). 
117  E.g., Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183, 187 
(2006) (per curiam); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2003), amended 
by 367 F.3d 1067 (2004). 
118  E.g., Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 362 (1st Cir. 2011); Passi v. Mukasey, 
535 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2008). 
119  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 96 (1988) (confirming that an abuse of discretion standard 
applies for motions to reopen); Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2013) (remand-
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not determine whether the record compels a particular conclusion concerning 
the applicants’ persecution claims. 
Immigration law reasonably precludes applicants from obtaining asylum 
relief when applicants themselves engaged in persecutory acts against others.120 
While the act of persecuting and being persecuted might appear to involve 
comparable inquiries, the analysis applicable to persecutor bar cases contain 
several distinctions that ordinarily warrant excluding them from the pool of 
persecution cases ultimately analyzed.121 For example, persecutor bar cases of-
ten entail an inquiry into whether the applicant “assisted” in the persecution of 
others,122 had the requisite level of “personal involvement,”123 or had the requi-
site mental state needed to establish the applicant’s role as a persecutor.124 
The standards applicable to humanitarian asylum claims also differ from 
regular persecution inquiries. Because a grant of humanitarian asylum does not 
require applicants to establish an objective fear of future harm, the harm al-
leged must be incredibly severe—more severe than the conduct needed to 
simply establish past persecution.125 Accordingly, including court decisions that 
are grounded in an assessment of humanitarian asylum would obscure the true 
baseline threshold of persecutory conduct in certain instances. Specifically, in-
cluding such cases would obscure the threshold when an appellate court deter-
mines that the record does not compel the conclusion that the applicant was 
harmed to a level that would necessitate a finding of humanitarian asylum.126 
After all, harm may rise to the level of persecution even if the harm is not egre-
gious enough to pierce the humanitarian asylum threshold. Conversely, if an 
appellate court were compelled to find that a set of harms is severe enough to 
satisfy the humanitarian asylum threshold, then such harms would necessarily 
rise to the level of persecution. As such, this study did not eliminate cases 
where the appellate court found that the record compelled the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                
ing due to the Board’s faulty determination that the applicant failed to establish changed 
country conditions); Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
applicant proffered a “plausible” asylum claim). 
120  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (setting out the persecutor bar). 
121  See Balachova v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the agency 
“confused illegality with persecution” when it assessed whether the persecutor bar applied). 
122  Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing the persecutor bar in rela-
tion to forced abortions in China); Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (assessing 
whether the applicant “assisted” in the persecution of others). 
123  Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 
124  Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517–18 (2009) (reviewing whether coercion is a viable 
defense); cf. Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 258–66 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the 
material support bar). 
125  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii) (2014). 
126  Bachkova v. INS, 109 F.3d 376, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the Board did not abuse 
its discretion by denying humanitarian asylum). 
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the harm suffered by the applicant was severe enough to satisfy the humanitari-
an asylum standard.127 
For persecution assessments, the ultimate determination courts typically 
must make is whether an applicant established a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.128 As such, it might seem counter-intuitive to not assess cases that review 
specifically whether an applicant established a well-founded fear of being per-
secuted. Excluding many of these cases, however, is warranted because of the 
prospective nature of the inquiry. The well-founded fear analysis entails a two-
part test when it is not presumed because of past persecution.129 First, the appli-
cant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the proffered harm will occur in 
the applicant’s home country.130 In this respect, the inquiry is based on the 
probability of a specific event taking place rather than a description of the par-
ticular harmful events themselves. As such, court decisions premised on this 
probability component are not instructive to an assessment of when conduct 
rises to the level of persecution.131 
The second component of the well-founded fear inquiry does concern the 
harm feared. The appellate courts’ discussions of the feared harms, however, 
are often vague and nondescript.132 Because the courts are assessing what might 
take place in the future, the extent of harm findings in this context is often lim-
ited to general or obvious observations, such as a fear of “murder” or “torture” 
qualifying as sufficiently serious harm.133 This level of generality significantly 
diminishes the utility of these descriptions. 
As a subset of well-founded fear inquiries, this study also generally ex-
cluded “pattern or practice” persecution cases.134 As noted previously, appli-
cants do not need to show they will be singled out for persecution if they can 
establish a pattern or practice of persecution against a group to which they be-
                                                        
127  Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the past harm egregious 
enough to satisfy the humanitarian asylum threshold). 
128  See id. at 1205 (reviewing how in “most instances” an applicant must establish a well-
founded fear of being persecuted in the future). 
129  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (discussing the well-founded fear presumption). 
130  Id. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) 
(determining that an applicant need not establish that he or she would more likely than not be 
persecuted upon return to the home country). 
131  Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 159–62 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the probability that 
the applicant would be subjected to China’s population control measures); Canales-Vargas v. 
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the evidence established the requisite 
probability of future harm). 
132  See, e.g., El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing the feared 
harm as “economic discrimination”); Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(hypothesizing possible future harms). 
133  See, e.g., Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 
134  E.g., Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a possibility 
of “physical harm or death” against Armenians in Russia); Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 
1036–37 (9th Cir. 1999) (construing a prospective harm inquiry as potentially grounded in a 
pattern or practice of persecution against the applicant’s family). 
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long.135 The premise of such claims is that widespread abuse of a group to 
which the applicant belongs itself establishes a reasonable possibility that the 
applicant will face harm.136 Consequently, the harm that the applicant claims to 
fear is just as vague, if not more so, than ordinary singled-out claims. 
Given this vagueness within prospective persecution inquires, past persecu-
tion findings are most appropriate for assessing the requisite harm needed to 
establish persecution. For past persecution inquiries, the courts must assess a 
set of circumstances and harms that are more concrete and specific because, to 
affirm the evident, they have already happened.137 The undermining abstraction 
of prospective inquiries is mitigated by the more detail-heavy evaluation of 
harms that have already taken place.138 
As a final point, it should be noted that this study does not comprehensive-
ly review cases that concern coercive population control policies. The INA 
provides that an applicant can establish persecution if the applicant was forced 
to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure, or demonstrates “other re-
sistance” to a government’s population control policies.139 The statutory 
grounding of these claims often requires an analysis that is distinguishable from 
other persecution assessments.140 
4. General Flaws in Procedure 
Immigration courts must provide applicants with an asylum hearing that 
comports with procedural due process requirements.141 Appellate courts have 
ultimately remanded a number of asylum cases for procedural deficiencies un-
                                                        
135  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(B). 
136  Rasiah v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining how widespread harm against 
a particular group creates “a reasonable likelihood of persecution of all persons in the 
group”). 
137  Due to the same issues regarding probability and harm specificity, the ultimate case pool 
also does not regularly include claims analyzed under the Ninth Circuit’s “disfavored group” 
threshold. See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the court’s dis-
favored group analysis). 
138  Nevertheless, a well-grounded and consistent understanding of the harms that establish 
persecution should still drive courts’ evaluations of the requisite prospective harm threshold.  
139  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012). 
140  For example, coercive population control policies often concern mixed questions of law 
and fact, as well as analyses of whether an applicant’s claim satisfied the particular (and fair-
ly rigid) requirements of the INA’s coercive population control provision. See, e.g., Liu v. 
Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (assessing whether the facts alleged by the appli-
cant fell within the other resistance category). The fact that this study does not analyze popu-
lation control claims in no way implies that these cases are not relevant to understanding 
persecution or that courts’ holdings on this issue are necessarily consistent. Compare Jiang 
v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding persecution compelled where the 
applicant’s wife was forced to undergo an abortion, authorities made him pay a fine, and he 
fled the country to avoid arrest), with Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 318, 320–21 (7th Cir. 
2006) (finding persecution was not compelled where the applicant’s girlfriend was forced to 
undergo an abortion and authorities struck the applicant’s head with a brick). 
141  Somakoko v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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related to the merits of the case. For example, the courts have remanded cases 
because the immigration judge exhibited bias or open hostility toward the ap-
plicant during the hearing,142 or prevented the applicant from presenting rele-
vant evidence.143 Additionally, courts have reversed cases where the Board 
took administrative notice of non-record facts and rendered decisions without 
first providing applicants with an opportunity to respond.144 In addition to pro-
cedural deficiencies for which the agency is responsible, applicants’ failure to 
follow procedural requirements can also cause a reviewing court to decline to 
assess the merits of a persecution decision. Consequently, this study eliminated 
decisions where the applicant failed to exhaust to the Board,145 or waived be-
fore the court,146 any challenge to the immigration judge’s determination that 
the applicant failed to establish persecution. 
5. Flaws in EOIR’s Decisionmaking Process 
The general principles of administrative law that govern appellate court re-
view under the substantial evidence standard provide the courts with several 
avenues to remand a persecution determination without first having to decide 
that the record compels a finding of persecution.147 The Second Circuit in Man-
zur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security aptly summarized these circumstances 
when it noted appellate courts’ “substantial authority to vacate and remand 
[Board] and [immigration judge] decisions that result from flawed reasoning, a 
sufficiently flawed fact-finding process, or the application of improper legal 
standards.”148 To be sure, applicants do not appeal the decisions of immigration 
judges directly to appellate courts. Nevertheless, because the Board may sum-
marily affirm or simply supplement the decision of the immigration judge, of-
ten the appellate courts directly review the decisions of immigration judges.149 
                                                        
142  See, e.g., Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen an [immigration 
judge’s] conduct results in the appearance of bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a 
meaningful review of the decision below, we remand.”). 
143  See, e.g., Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Niam v. Ash-
croft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). 
144  See, e.g., Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
145  E.g., Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to consider a “flight” ar-
gument based on a failure to exhaust); Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the applicant failed to raise a past persecution argument to the Board). 
146  E.g., Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the applicants 
waived their challenge to the agency’s past persecution holding); Carcamo-Recinos v. Ash-
croft, 389 F.3d 253, 257 (1st Cir. 2004) (same). 
147  See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481–82 (1951) (espousing the need 
to consider the record as a whole); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (pre-
cluding the reviewing court from basing its decision on “grounds” not provided by the agen-
cy). 
148  Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 2007). 
149  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2014) (authorizing “[a]ffirmance without opinion”); Chen v. 
BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing how the type of decision rendered by the 
Board affects the court’s scope of review). 
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Consequently, because the agency errors that Manzur pointed to can stem from 
problematic Board analyses or the Board’s failure to correct decisionmaking 
flaws made by immigration judges, this section will sometimes refer to flaws 
committed by the “agency,” which encompasses both circumstances. 
The extensive bases for remand available to appellate courts soften the nar-
row scope of review that the INA would otherwise mandate for findings of 
fact.150 The Seventh Circuit in Gomes v. Gonzales succinctly explained the dis-
tinction between court decisions to remand for decisionmaking flaws as op-
posed to remands based on the record compelling a contrary conclusion: 
[I]n order to reverse a finding of past persecution or a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution we must be convinced that the evidence compels a decision 
contrary to the Board’s. In order to earn this degree of deference, however, the 
[immigration judge] must announce [his or her] decision in terms sufficient to 
enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely 
reacted.151 
The perception of hearing and thinking about the evidence, rather than 
merely reacting to it, represents the decisionmaking flaws that appellate courts 
have authority to assess and remand for correction.152 These perceived process 
flaws can serve as threshold considerations before courts are obligated to pro-
vide the requisite deference to findings of fact like persecution determinations. 
Under their authority to mend errors in the decisionmaking process, the 
courts have remanded persecution assessments that misapprehend circuit case 
law153 as well as previous Board decisions.154 Even if the Board properly as-
sessed the law when it rendered its decision, the courts have remanded persecu-
tion determinations when case law issued subsequent to the Board’s decision 
changed the legal landscape.155 In some instances, the courts remand because 
                                                        
150  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012) (precluding reversal unless the record compels a 
contrary conclusion). 
151  Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir.2004) and Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 
589, 592 (7th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152  See Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 556–58 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing, in the context 
of credibility determinations, what adjudicators must do to demonstrate that they adequately 
reviewed the record). 
153  See, e.g., Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the 
Board failed to consider how harm to third parties impacted the applicant’s asylum claim); 
Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 1998) (remanding because the Board analogized to 
cases applicable to humanitarian asylum claims). 
154  See, e.g., Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (criticizing the 
Board’s interpretation of whether kidnapping qualifies as persecution). 
155  See, e.g., Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (remanding to permit the 
Board to reconsider its economic persecution assessment in light of In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 163 (B.I.A. 2007)); Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 295 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (same). 
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they believe the Board erred by failing to assess an applicant’s persecution 
claim at all.156 
Aside from these erroneous interpretations of the law and other agency ap-
plications of an incorrect legal framework,157 the vast majority of cases re-
manded for decisionmaking process flaws can be broken down into four cate-
gories. The first category of cases concerns agency decisions that fail to 
adequately articulate the reasons for finding no persecution.158 The premise 
here is not that the agency’s ultimate holding is necessarily incorrect, but rather 
that the court cannot fully decipher the justifications for the outcome.159 
The last three categories all concern perceived misapprehensions of record 
evidence. Within the second category of cases, the courts have regularly re-
manded agency decisions because the agency failed to consider evidence of 
record.160 A reviewing court does not have to provide deference when the 
agency does not base its decision on the entire record, but the court does have 
to provide the agency with an opportunity to assess all the evidence in the first 
instance.161 As a corollary to the need to consider all relevant evidence, the 
courts have also remanded cases where the agency’s holding is based on an er-
roneous interpretation of record facts relevant to its persecution assessment.162 
The last category of cases is even more specific. It concerns circumstances 
where the agency considered all evidence of record, but drew unfounded infer-
ences from the record evidence that it then factored into its persecution assess-
ment.163 
                                                        
156  See, e.g., Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding “no ambiguity 
and no language suggesting that the [immigration judge] actually applied or even knew the 
correct standard for asylum”); Hernandez-Barrera v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(finding that neither the Board nor the immigration judge specifically addressed past perse-
cution). 
157  See, e.g., Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 570–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (remanding for 
clarity about the role the applicant’s age should play in the persecution assessment); Gjolaj 
v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (remand-
ing because the Board failed to consider the applicant’s harms cumulatively as the law re-
quires). 
158  E.g., Halo v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 15, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2005) (remarking on the lack of 
clarity in the record as to why the facts did not establish persecution); Recinos de Leon v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the immigration judge’s opinion 
“literally incomprehensible”). 
159  See Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2005). 
160  See, e.g., Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2011) (“If there is a reason for dis-
counting or ignoring these incidents, it is not explained in either decision.”); Kone v. Holder, 
620 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Board “overlooked a key aspect” of 
the applicant’s claim). 
161  INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (affording the Board the opportunity to as-
sess the issue in the first instance). 
162  See, e.g., Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
Board incorrectly interpreted the country report). 
163  See, e.g., Zarouite v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he problem here is 
that the country report does not directly address such behavior at all, so the rationality of the 
inference is open to question.”); Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2005) 
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D. The Final Case Sample 
After discounting cases based on the myriad aforementioned reasons, this 
study identified 204 cases where the court addressed on the merits whether the 
record compelled the conclusion that the applicant was persecuted. Within 
these 204 cases, the appellate courts held that the record compelled a finding of 
persecution in 66 of them.164 In the remaining 138 cases, the court determined 
that the record did not compel the conclusion that the assailants persecuted the 
applicants.165 
It is telling that only sixty-six binding cases found that a set of harms com-
pelled the conclusion that assailants persecuted the applicants. The low number 
demonstrates courts’ understanding of the significance of holding that a par-
ticular set of harms necessarily qualify as persecutory.166 Despite this seeming-
ly low number of cases, these decisions (and others, erroneously167) provide the 
basis for comparison in the numerous asylum cases where the threshold for es-
tablishing persecution is at issue. 
The 138 cases where a finding of persecution was not compelled are rele-
vant to this study in a different way. While persecution-compelled cases neces-
sarily provide a set of facts that establish persecution, the converse does not 
yield the same result—that is, a determination that a set of harms fails to com-
pel a finding of persecution does not preclude the agency from determining in 
the future that a comparable set of harms is sufficiently severe.168 Nevertheless, 
these 138 cases are germane to assessing the threshold for persecutory conduct 
because they provide a window into the harms that courts do not believe are 
necessarily sufficient. Consequently, juxtaposing them with persecution-
compelled cases allows this study to assess any disparities and inconsistencies 
among court decisions regarding persecution’s threshold. 
                                                                                                                                
(faulting the Board for assuming the applicant could afford a fine the government allegedly 
imposed on her). 
164  See Supplement Schedule S1, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/. The final 
case list for necessarily persecutory conduct included several cases where the court did not 
expressly state that the record compelled a contrary conclusion because the holding unam-
biguously indicated that the court determined that the harm experienced by the applicant rose 
to the level of persecution. E.g., Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2004). 
165  See Supplement Schedule S2, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/. 
166  The number, of course, would be higher if this study reviewed the decisions of all the 
appellate courts. 
167  See supra Part II.C.5 (discussing ambiguities in courts’ bases for remand); infra Part IV 
(noting how courts sometimes misconstrue past cases as establishing necessarily persecutory 
conduct). 
168  Yasinskyy v. Holder, 724 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2013) (faulting the petitioner for failing 
to make the distinction). 
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III. FINDINGS 
The case sample depicts salient inconsistencies in the level of suffering that 
courts require applicants to endure to establish they were persecuted. Despite 
these inconsistencies, this study documented several threshold levels of suffer-
ing that courts appear to universally regard as sufficiently severe. Part III will 
review these areas of agreement before transitioning to an assessment of the 
numerous divergences. 
A. Harm Universally Regarded as Rising to the Level of Persecution 
Within the circuits reviewed, this study concludes that certain types of 
harms are universally regarded as sufficient to establish persecution. For such 
harm combinations, the courts in many instances affirmed that they compel a 
finding of persecution. Even within circuits that have not had an opportunity to 
address specifically a comparable combination of harms, they have never con-
cluded that analogously perpetrated harm would fail to establish persecution, 
and a review of the harm thresholds depicted throughout the case law indicates 
that they likely would not in the future. 
The conduct that courts universally regard as persecutory can be divided 
into five categories based on the severity, type, and frequency of the harm en-
dured. The categories, however, are not always mutually exclusive; in certain 
instances, particular fact patterns can fall within multiple categories. Thus, for 
example, a fact pattern may demonstrate a sufficiently severe cumulative set of 
harms under Category 2, while also depicting a set of harms that fall under Cat-
egory 3 because they escalate in severity before the applicant flees the country. 
Nevertheless, recognizing and distinguishing the five patterns of harm and their 
impact on adjudicators’ persecution assessments is warranted because the dis-
tinctions between them can impact the overall level of harm an applicant must 
endure to establish he or she was persecuted.169 
1. Brutal and Systematic Physical Abuse 
 The first class of cases concerns abhorrent and systematic harm that is 
predominantly or entirely physical; Tchemkou v. Gonzales is illustrative.170 In 
Tchemkou, police threatened the applicant while she attended a rally.171 After 
threatening her, officers struck her mouth with a baton, which caused her to 
lose two teeth.172 They transported her to the police station and proceeded to 
beat her further while they interrogated and threatened to kill her.173 The appli-
                                                        
169  The categorization can potentially impact the requisite level of harm because of what this 
article refers to as persecution’s temporal dimension. See infra Part IV.C. 
170  Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2007). 
171  Id. at 787. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. 
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cant was subsequently detained for three days in a cell too crowded to lay down 
in.174 During her detention, police did not provide her with food or water, toi-
lets were not available, and she was forced to clean male prisoners’ excre-
ment.175 Once released, she had to stay in a hospital for two weeks to recov-
er.176 
Fearing for her safety, she fled temporarily to a neighboring country where 
she received treatment for her depression.177 When she returned, the applicant 
attended a university.178 During a meeting to discuss the politically-motivated 
closing of her educational department, police raided the meeting and confiscat-
ed a list of attendees.179 That night, armed men came to her house, interrogated 
her, gagged and blindfolded her, forced her into a car, and drove her to an iso-
lated area.180 The armed men then beat and kicked her and tore off part of her 
ear, which caused her to lose consciousness.181 She had to spend twenty-four 
days in a hospital to recover and subsequently obtained psychological counsel-
ing.182 Several years later, she attended two separate demonstrations.183 During 
both demonstrations she sustained minor injuries.184 
The details of Tchemkou illustrate a number of core characteristics of the 
collective harm experienced by an applicant that courts recognize as sufficient 
to establish persecution.185 First, the applicant sustained harm on a consistent 
basis over a prolonged period of time.186 The appellate courts all view the sys-
tematic nature of repeated instances of harm as germane (if not essential187) to a 
persecution finding.188 Second, the applicant experienced physical harm the se-
                                                        
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. at 787–88. 
178  Id. at 788. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 788–89. 
184  Id. 
185  See, e.g., Narayan v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1065, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
applicant was stabbed); see also Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing 
in detail why the repeated physical injuries sustained by the applicant amounted to persecu-
tion despite the immigration judge’s hesitant conclusion that the applicant likely established 
he was persecuted); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 
“[twenty-five] days of deprivation, whippings, and beatings” sufficiently severe despite the 
agency’s proportionality determination). 
186  Tchemkou, 495 F.3d at 787–89 (recounting incidents that occurred between 1993 and 
2001). 
187  Decky v. Holder, 587 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 2009) (listing the lack of systematic mis-
treatment as the “critical factor driving our determination”). 
188  See, e.g., Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that repeated 
abuse “create[s] a more compelling case for finding persecution” but it is not required) 
(quoting Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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verity of which a reviewing body can readily assess. As opposed to a generic 
“beating” or other nondescript recollections, a description that includes the loss 
of teeth and part of an ear allows courts to more readily quantify the extent of 
harm suffered.189 Relatedly, the applicant reported a prolonged hospital stay 
that served to buttress the gravity of harm she suffered.190 The appellate courts 
regularly survey the extent of any subsequent medical treatment when assessing 
the severity of harm.191 
2. Sufficiently Recurrent Combination of Cumulatively Severe Harms 
Physical harm has been viewed as central to what it means to be persecut-
ed,192 but it is by no means the only type of harm relevant to a persecution as-
sessment. Relevant non-physical harms include surveillance, unauthorized 
searches of places and persons, economic impediments, psychological harm 
such as death threats, and restrictions on fundamental beliefs and practices such 
as religious worship.193 Published cases have not yielded any circumstances 
where searches and surveillance alone are sufficient to establish persecution.194 
While the deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage can itself 
suffice to establish persecution,195 the appellate courts have not rendered con-
sistent opinions on the extent of debilitating conditions that would suffice;196 a 
total loss of all economic opportunity and means of support appears to be the 
                                                        
189  See Dandan, 339 F.3d at 574 (faulting the applicant’s vague description of the harm he 
suffered); see also Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the appli-
cant sustained scars from the physical degradation). 
190  Tchemkou, 495 F.3d at 787–88 (documenting two hospital stays totaling thirty-eight 
days). 
191  See, e.g., Ouk v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2007) (factoring into its decision the 
applicant’s failure to seek medical treatment); Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (same); see also Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (mentioning that 
the applicant had to seek medical treatment). 
192  Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing a “lack of physical harm” 
as a basis for denying the petition); Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Physical harm has consistently been treated as persecution.”). 
193  Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing alleged surveillance of 
the applicant’s father); Li v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2005) (re-
viewing economic harm); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2004) (discuss-
ing deprivations of religious freedom). 
194  See, e.g., Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing “searches” and 
“phone taps” as “harassment”); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no 
persecution where authorities searched the applicant’s home three times). 
195  In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170–75 (B.I.A. 2007). 
196  The inconsistencies among appellate courts are caused, in part, by conflicting interpreta-
tions of economic persecution standards. Compare Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 223 
(2d Cir. 2006) (providing three different potential standards for assessing economic persecu-
tion claims), with Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (10th Cir. 2008) (ap-
plying the “life or freedom” test to distinct circumstances). 
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extent of agreement.197 Indeed, courts rarely confront such circumstances be-
cause other forms of harm usually accompany economic hardships.198 Similar-
ly, while courts proffer the possibility that certain threats may themselves rise 
to the level of persecution,199 there is no accepted threshold of threatening cir-
cumstances that adjudicators deem sufficient.200 Thus, the relevance of many 
forms of harms to persecution assessments depends upon their cumulative ef-
fect on applicants’ past experiences as a whole. 
A plethora of different harm combinations comprise courts’ persecution as-
sessments, but several harm combinations exemplify the cumulative level of 
suffering that courts have determined compel a persecution finding.201 One 
such case is Smolniakova v. Gonzales, where a combination of menacing be-
havior, substantiated threats, physical harm, and curtailment of religious free-
dom compelled the court to conclude that the applicant had been persecuted.202 
The applicant experienced “anti-Semitic profanities scribbled on the walls of 
her apartment entryway, human feces smeared on her mailbox, fires set in her 
mailbox, and repeated slashings of her front door.”203 Over a three-year period, 
she was forced to practice her religion in secret with a group of other Russian 
Jews.204 Several members of her group were stabbed to death and the perpetra-
                                                        
197  Compare Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the ap-
plicant established he was persecuted where the perpetrators’ actions made it “virtually im-
possible” to earn a living), with Ubau-Marenco v. INS, 67 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 1995) (de-
termining that the confiscation of the family business without compensation might not be 
sufficiently severe). 
198  See, e.g., Krotova v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing “eco-
nomic pressure” as a factor). 
199  Gonzales-Neyra v. INS, 122 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding death threats suffi-
cient). 
200  See infra Part III.B.2–3 (discussing appellate courts’ inconsistent assessments of threats 
and other psychological harms); see also Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If 
mere threats, without more, were enough to constitute past persecution, then it is not clear 
what would be left of the [well-founded fear] category.”). 
201  See, e.g., Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899, 902–04, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the applicant was persecuted because he was fined five months’ salary, expelled from 
school, detained on three occasions, and beaten twice); Cecaj v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 897, 
899–900 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the applicant was persecuted based on “two detentions with 
beatings, a gunshot intended to intimidate, threatening phone calls, the kidnapping of a child, 
and another threat”); Maini v. INS, 212 F.3d 1167, 1171–72, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding 
persecution compelled where the applicant was stabbed, threatened with death, and rendered 
unconscious); Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding humani-
tarian asylum compelled where the applicant suffered, among other harms, extended physi-
cal and psychological abuse, permanent medical ailments after assailants denied him treat-
ment, and forced “reeducation”). The harm experienced by the applicant in Bondarenko 
arguably rises to a level of harm accepted as sufficient within each evaluated appellate court, 
but the context of the protests that led the applicant to sustain the harms render the universal 
acceptance of this type of suffering less than certain for reasons that are beyond the scope of 
this article. 
202  Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2005). 
203  Id. at 1041. 
204  Id. 
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tors threatened the same fate for other Jews.205 The perpetrators carried through 
on their threats on at least one other occasion, killing another member of her 
group.206 Subsequently, assailants grabbed the applicant on the street and stran-
gled her while one called her a “Jewish Bitch.”207 Six months after the stran-
gling, assailants pounded on her door and threatened to kill her if she did not let 
them into the “Jewish snake nest.”208 
Mamouzian v. Ashcroft provides another set of harm combinations that il-
lustrate the threshold of necessarily persecutory conduct. The court held that 
the record compelled a finding that the applicant was persecuted based on a his-
tory of physical injury, detention, diminished economic opportunities, searches 
and surveillance, and threats.209 The applicant was arrested and detained for 
one week, during which time police beat her until she lost consciousness.210 
The police only released her because she agreed to pay a fine.211 Her boss sub-
sequently fired her, and she was unable to secure another job.212 The following 
year, police beat her during a political demonstration and then arrested her.213 A 
judge subsequently ordered her to remain in the country for two years and she 
was again forced to pay a fine to secure her release.214 Throughout the follow-
ing months, authorities followed her and occasionally threatened her.215 She 
decided to flee after police searched her house, slapped and kicked her, and 
threatened to jail her again.216 As this case and Smolniakova illustrate, courts 
will find persecution compelled based on an ongoing pattern of physical, psy-
chological, and other types of harm, as long as the harms cumulatively establish 
a sufficiently high level of severity. 
3. Recurrent Injury Preceding a Harm Crescendo 
The courts have found that multiple incidents of relatively severe harm es-
tablish persecution when the applicant’s experience in his or her home country 
culminates in particularly egregious harm. An example is Bace v. Ashcroft, 
where the applicant was physically harmed four times over the course of two 
months.217 Initially, eight assailants beat the applicant and slashed him with a 
                                                        
205  Id. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. at 1042. 
208  Id. 
209  Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004). 
210  Id. at 1132. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. 
216  Id. 
217  Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Ly v. Mukasey, 524 
F.3d 126, 130, 132 (1st Cir. 2008) (considering the culminating event of the applicant’s hus-
band being killed even though the murder occurred after the applicant fled); cf. Nakibuka v. 
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razor.218 Shortly thereafter, a group of men beat the applicant, and two days lat-
er the applicant was again accosted and beaten.219 Finally, nearly one month 
later, armed men forced their way into the applicant’s home, hit him with the 
butt of a rifle, struck his father, beat him further when he tried to come to his 
father’s aid, and then raped his wife in front of him and his family while the in-
truders taunted him.220 The applicant and his wife fled shortly thereafter.221 
Unlike the lurid details of the physical attacks and ailments recounted by 
the applicant in Tchemkou, the applicant in Bace did not provide the specifics 
of each beating nor did he indicate that his injuries required recovery time, 
much less formal medical attention.222 Nevertheless, these comparatively less 
severe physical injuries culminated in a particularly horrid form of harm. While 
the harm experienced by the applicant was not predominantly physical, the 
psychological pain caused by having to watch his wife raped was sufficient. 
This culminating incident is merely illustrative of what this article labels the 
crescendo effect: a series of harms that culminate in a particularly egregious 
and impactful harm which occurs at the end of an applicant’s past experiences 
in his or her home country.223 
Past experiences of a requisite severity that culminate in such crescendos 
demonstrate persecutory conduct for several reasons. First, a crescendo event 
necessarily requires multiple harms over a period of time, which supports the 
systematic quality of harm that courts universally accept as germane.224 Sec-
ond, it provides an objectively reasonable justification for the applicant to flee, 
as the escalating nature of the harms leads to the reasonable inference that addi-
tional harm would only continue to be more severe.225 Third, it validates the 
seriousness of the harms experienced by the applicant prior to the crescendo 
                                                                                                                                
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing the threats against the applicant 
as “escalating”). 
218  Bace, 352 F.3d at 1135. 
219  Id. at 1135–36. 
220  Id. at 1136. 
221  Id. 
222  If the applicant did provide such detail, the court did not find it relevant enough to in-
clude in its review of the facts. See id. at 1134–36. 
223  See, e.g., Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 895, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2002) (applicant’s past expe-
riences culminated in the kidnap and murder of her husband). 
224  Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (“An important factor in deter-
mining where a specific case falls along this continuum is whether the mistreatment can be 
said to be systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents.”); Dandan v. 
Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although the frequency issue is not disposi-
tive, it does figure significantly in the analysis.”). 
225  Objective criteria that support the level of psychological suffering experienced by the 
applicant before fleeing is a distinct issue from the question of whether the assailant’s ac-
tions increase the likelihood that the applicant would be harmed if deported to his or her 
home country. The latter is only relevant to the prospective “well-founded fear” analysis. 
Compare Boykov v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997) (linking unfulfilled threats to 
“the danger of future persecution”), with Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247, 1249 
(9th Cir. 1999) (factoring threats into its past persecution assessment). 
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event. An applicant might claim that past events caused him to live in a con-
stant state of fear for himself and his family (and such psychological suffering 
is relevant226), but the culminating event provides objective corroboration that 
such fear reasonably existed. Thus, the applicant’s prior experiences are not 
merely isolated instances of abuse. Rather, they are the physical abuse compo-
nent of a continuous experience of physical and psychological anguish that, 
given the requisite level of severity, is sufficient to establish persecution.227 
4. Sufficient Harm Preceding a Substantiated Flight Precipitator 
While a series of incidents culminating in particularly acute harm estab-
lishes persecution when the harm experienced is analogous in severity to Bace, 
a culminating incident might be sufficient even if it is not the most severe event 
the applicant experienced. In such circumstances, a credible and substantiated 
event causes the applicant to flee before the perpetrators can dispense an antici-
pated egregious harm that they have the means (and desire) to perpetrate. In Sa-
laam v. INS, for example, the applicant was arrested and “flogged” on four sep-
arate occasions.228 While the court did not specify the details of the harm in-
inflicted, the record did reflect that the perpetrated physical harms left visible 
scars on multiple locations of the applicant’s body.229 At some point after au-
thorities released the applicant from his fourth arrest, the applicant learned that 
police sought to arrest him again.230 Upon learning of the authorities’ intention, 
the applicant evaded government officials until he was able to flee the coun-
try.231 Thus, authorities’ attempt to arrest the applicant for the fifth time served 
as the flight precipitator. 
Flight precipitators can be verbal or action-based, and either direct or indi-
rect. The most common verbal flight precipitator is a direct threat, where the 
assailant threatens the applicant with severe harm or death, either as an inevita-
ble reality in the near future or if the applicant fails to leave the country.232 A 
threat is indirect if the applicant learns about it through a third party rather than 
                                                        
226  See Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing threats as poten-
tially actionable psychological harm). 
227  See Rempell, supra note 48, at 319–23 (advocating a model to gauge harm that assesses 
the applicant’s continuous experience in his or her home country). 
228  Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
229  Id. 
230  Id. at 1236–37. 
231  Id. at 1237. 
232  See, e.g., Karapetyan v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1118, 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing 
how assailants threatened to kill the applicant if he failed to leave the country); Ahmed v. 
Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that authorities threatened to kill the 
applicant the next time they caught him protesting); Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1164, 
1168–69 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the applicant fled after police officers beat him and told 
him to leave the country). 
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the assailants themselves.233 Salaam provides an example of an action-based 
precipitator.234 Although the assailants in Salaam did not threaten to arrest and 
harm the applicant, their very act of trying to arrest him, combined with the 
consequences of prior arrests, leads to the same reasonable inference: that a 
failure to flee will cause the assailants to severely harm the applicant.235 In this 
case, the implicit consequences are substantiated by a pattern of prior harm 
doled out by the assailants. The relevance of explicit or implicit threats dimin-
ishes considerably if the surrounding circumstances do not substantiate the like-
lihood of future harm.236 
Flight precipitator fact patterns have a special place in the lexicon of perse-
cution-compelled cases because they epitomize the quintessential refugee nar-
rative—that is, the image of individuals who are forced to flee their home coun-
tries in great haste to escape looming atrocities nipping at their coattails.237 To 
be sure, the precipitating event does itself cause harm, even if it is mainly fear-
based psychological harm experienced by applicants as they contemplate the 
fate in store for them.238 Applicants, however, do not necessarily establish past 
persecution simply because a threat caused them to flee. Rather, an applicant 
who manages to flee before the assailant has an opportunity to act on the 
threatened harm is more likely to successfully use this event as proof that he or 
she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if returned to the home coun-
try.239 Because courts regularly link past threats to the objective reasonableness 
of an applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted, asylum cases that con-
cern a harm precipitator without sufficient previous events have not been con-
                                                        
233  Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (recounting that the appli-
cant’s neighbor informed him that two individuals were searching for him). 
234  Salaam, 229 F.3d at 1237; see also Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (men-
tioning that the applicant fled because the government was looking for individuals who pro-
tested during an event he attended); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 
2005) (recounting that the applicant went to several different places to avoid detection). 
235  Salaam, 229 F.3d at 1236–37; cf. Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(finding that the time the applicant spent in the country without incident before he left dimin-
ished his claim). 
236  See Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing cases that 
discounted “unfulfilled threats”). 
237  See Barbara Frey & Deepika Udagama, Assisting Indigent Political Asylum Seekers in 
the United States: A Model for Volunteer Legal Assistance, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 661, 665 
(1990) (discussing the situation of “asylum applicants who fled their countries with virtually 
nothing more than the clothes on their backs”); Whitney A. Reitz, Reflections on the Special 
Humanitarian Parole Program for Haitian Orphans, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 791, 796 
(2011) (recalling the plight of refugees who are “generally running for their lives, with noth-
ing but the clothes on their backs”). 
238  See Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To live, day after day, 
knowing that government forces might secretly arrest and execute you is itself a form of 
mental anguish that can constitute persecution.”). 
239  Touch, 568 F.3d at 40 (“Unfulfilled threats [are] construed more naturally as evidence of 
a well-founded fear of future persecution.”); Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 
2002) (linking past threats to “the reasonableness of a fear of future persecution”). 
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sistently found to qualify as persecution.240 While the circumstances in numer-
ous cases concern harm culminating in a flight precipitator, Salaam is illustra-
tive of the particular level of harm severity and threat substantiation that will 
necessarily lead to a finding of persecution.241 
5. Sufficiently Severe or Recurring Sexual Abuse 
As the Bace court’s assessment of witnessing sexual abuse exemplifies, 
courts recognize sexual abuse as a particularly egregious and serious form of 
harm in their persecution assessments. In Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, for exam-
ple, the applicant experienced repeated sexual abuse and threats.242 On one oc-
casion, a police officer detained the applicant for twenty-four hours, even 
though he had not committed any crime.243 Subsequently, on nine separate oc-
casions, the officer forced the applicant to perform oral sex on him.244 During 
these encounters, the officer would hit the applicant and taunt him by threaten-
ing that no one would care if the applicant was murdered.245 During one of the 
forced encounters, the officer held a loaded gun to the applicant’s head.246 
No court decision researched for this article indicated that sexual abuse of 
the severity and frequency experienced by the applicant in Boer-Sedano is not 
sufficient to establish persecution.247 Nevertheless, persecution based on sexual 
abuse does not necessarily require multiple incidents. Because of the physical 
and psychological harms associated with sexual abuse, the sampled courts ap-
pear to believe that even a single instance of rape is sufficiently severe, al-
though many of these statements are dicta or otherwise non-definitive.248 
Courts’ analyses concerning rape and persecution are often dicta because the 
                                                        
240  See, e.g., Ci Pan, 449 F.3d at 412–13 (collecting cases); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936–
37 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the threats insufficient to establish past persecution). 
241  Compare Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (persecu-
tion compelled), with Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (minimiz-
ing the significance of the threat that caused the applicant to go into hiding), and Mekhoukh 
v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 123, 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the applicant received sever-
al military draft notices and that he did not even allege that he suffered past persecution). 
242  Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005). 
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an 
officer persecuted the applicant based on two sexual assaults), overruled on other grounds by 
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005). 
248  E.g., Balachova v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 374, 386–87 (2d Cir. 2008) (expressing in dicta 
“no doubt that rape is sufficiently serious to constitute persecution”); Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 
421 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 
1996), for the proposition that “rape [on account of a protected ground] is a form of persecu-
tion”); Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that rape “may support 
a finding of past persecution” with the requisite nexus). For additional cases addressing this 
issue, see Supplement Schedule S7, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/. 
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vast majority of such cases at the appellate court level only concern the nexus 
and government involvement prongs of the refugee definition;249 immigration 
judges and the Board are correctly hesitant to find that rape is not a sufficiently 
severe harm. 
Not all instances of sexual abuse, however, are consistently accepted as 
sufficient to establish persecution. In Decky v. Holder, the court found that sex-
ual harassment and groping did not compel a finding of persecution.250 In other 
cases, the courts have even held that a combination of circumstances did not 
compel a finding of persecution when the applicant was sexually abused on one 
occasion.251 
Akin to the protection against many instances of sexual abuse, courts simi-
larly find persecution established based on certain harms to genitalia or those 
that impede or end pregnancy. By statute, forced abortions and sterilizations are 
per se persecutory.252 While not mandated by statute, the courts universally ac-
cept that female genital mutilation establishes persecution.253 
B. Inconsistent Assessments of Persecution’s Threshold 
The previous section discussed categories of cases that represent the extent 
of agreement among the appellate courts regarding the type, frequency, and se-
verity of conduct that necessarily constitutes persecution. Most asylum cases, 
however, do not concern persecution claims that fall within these parameters. 
The vast majority of persecution holdings entail divergent and inconsistent in-
terpretations of the harm needed to establish persecution. To illuminate these 
inconsistencies, the study isolated distinct categories of analogous cases to 
                                                        
249  See, e.g., Pheng v. Holder, 640 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (nexus); Castillo-Diaz v. 
Holder, 562 F.3d 23, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2009) (government involvement); Shoafera v. INS, 228 
F.3d 1070, 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (nexus). 
250  Decky v. Holder, 587 F.3d 104, 108, 111–12 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that the incidents 
centered around her childhood years). 
251  Cendrawasih v. Holder, 571 F.3d 128, 129, 131 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing the sexual 
assault as an “isolated incident[]”); see also Budiono v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 44, 46, 48–49 
(1st Cir. 2008) (finding no persecution where the applicant was groped and she found her 
friend’s naked body after she was sexually assaulted). 
252  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012). However, applicants cannot automatically establish 
persecution based on a forcible sterilization or abortion being performed on a spouse. Liu v. 
Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 821–22 (2d Cir. 2011). 
253  See, e.g., Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 765 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is clear that FGM 
constitutes persecution . . . .”); Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (not-
ing the court’s “well-settled” belief that FGM constitutes persecution); Abankwah v. INS, 
185 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that FGM’s “grave harm” constitutes persecution); 
see also In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (discussing the viability of FGM-
based asylum claims). Like the courts’ characterizations of rape, some of the courts’ state-
ments on whether FGM qualifies as persecution can be characterized as dicta because FGM 
disputes at the appellate level often concern whether the government can rebut the presump-
tion that the applicant will be harmed in the future. See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 112–
15 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing cases that assumed past persecution for the sake of argument). 
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compare. Apples-to-apples comparisons help make the inconsistencies striking-
ly apparent and provide greater insight into the different manner by which ad-
judicators perceive and measure harm. Since most persecution inquiries involve 
distinct fact patterns, this section also compares cases that fall outside the dis-
tinct categories of analogous cases but nevertheless depict inconsistent hold-
ings. 
1. Single Instance of Physical Abuse and Detention 
For cases that concern a single instance of abuse and detention, the courts 
do not need to determine whether a combination of harmful events establish 
persecution. Additionally, the physical nature of the harm is more tangible to 
evaluate than psychological harm. Consequently, a single instance of physical 
abuse and detention provides one of the best opportunities to isolate divergent 
harm thresholds. 
In Bejko v. Gonzales, the court held that the applicant’s detention did not 
compel the conclusion that he was persecuted.254 The applicant was detained 
for two weeks in a “small cell” under “primitive conditions” that included inad-
equate food and water and only one opportunity each day to use the bath-
room.255 The facts compelled a different conclusion in Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 
where police detained the applicant for ten days, during which time they forced 
the applicant to work at a construction site and hit the applicant each day with 
bags of sand.256 The applicant was never hit in the face and “suffered no signif-
icant injury.”257 The court held that these facts compelled the conclusion that 
the applicant was persecuted even though he “suffered no serious bodily injury 
and required no medical attention.”258 
 Bejko and Mihalev both concerned detentions that lasted for about two 
weeks. The courts reached opposite results, however, so the detention length 
cannot be traced as the determinative factor. Turning to the harm endured, 
forced construction work is not appreciably harsher than doing nothing in a jail 
cell other than holding one’s bowel movements between once-daily bathroom 
trips. The harm experienced by the applicant in Mihalev apparently crossed the 
persecution threshold because authorities hit his body with bags of sand.259 
Thus, at this point, persecution’s threshold can be expressed as a ten-day deten-
tion where, in addition to consistent general discomfort, there is recurrent mild 
physical harm that does not cause significant injury. 
                                                        
254  Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2006). The court also noted several addi-
tional minor instances that did not alter its severity calculus. Id. 
255  Id. at 484. 
256  Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 2004). 
257  Id. 
258  Id. at 730. Although police arrested the applicant on other occasions, the court did not 
consider them in its persecution assessment because the applicant failed to establish that they 
were sufficiently tethered to a protected ground. Id. at 727–28. 
259  Id. at 725. 
15 NEV. L.J. 142 - REMPELL.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
178 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:142 
Regardless of whether getting hit with sandbags should be outcome deter-
minative, other cases have, in any event, directly contradicted such harm as the 
threshold of persecutory conduct. Consider Khan v. Mukasey, where, as in 
Mihalev, authorities detained the applicant for ten days.260 The First Circuit 
found that the applicant’s experience did not necessarily establish that he was 
persecuted even though he was “beaten with wooden sticks and shocked with 
electrical wires” during his detention.261 Thus, harm significantly more severe 
than that suffered from sandbag blows did not compel a finding of persecution, 
while less severe harm did. 
The appellate courts have even reached divergent conclusions when as-
sessing the severity of electrocution. In Quan v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit 
found persecution compelled when, as in Khan, police administered electric 
shock on the applicant.262 Specifically, in addition to pushing and shaking her 
head repeatedly,263 the applicant in Quan was “poked once with an electric 
prod in her shoulder/neck area,”264 which caused a “severe headache,” dizzi-
ness, “blurry vision,” heavy perspiration, and almost made her pass out.265 The 
court found these injuries sufficient even though authorities only detained the 
applicant for less than a day.266 
In both Khan and Quan the applicants were detained and received at least 
one electric shock. Neither sought medical treatment after their releases.267 The 
main distinction is the length of detention, but only the much shorter detention 
compelled the court to conclude that the applicant’s experience established per-
secution. Although the applicant in Quan provided more detail about the effects 
of the electric shocks than the applicant in Khan, the symptoms she noted were 
short-lived.268 Thus, the courts found that the seemingly less severe instance of 
harm necessarily constituted persecution while the more severe event did not. 
Aside from decisions involving electric shock, the courts reached incon-
sistent results in several cases when the circumstances concerned comparable 
harm over the span of nearly identical time periods. In Guo v. Ashcroft, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the record compelled a finding of persecution based on a 
                                                        
260  Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 2008); Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 725. 
261  Khan, 549 F.3d at 575–77. 
262  Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2005). 
263  Id. at 888. 
264  Id. at 892 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). The majority opinion did not summarize each 
detail from the case. Id. at 886–89 (majority opinion). 
265  Id. at 889 (majority opinion). 
266  Id.; see also id. at 892 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). The court also noted that the appli-
cant was fired from her job, but this was not the focus of the court’s holding, nor does it im-
pact the discrepancy between the courts’ holdings in Quan and Khan. Id. at 889 (majority 
opinion). 
267  Id. at 888 (majority opinion); Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 2008). 
268  Compare Quan, 428 F.3d at 888–89, with Khan, 549 F.3d at 577. 
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one-and-a-half-day detention.269 While detained, officers hit the applicant twice 
in the face, forced him to do pushups “until he could no longer stand it,” and 
then kicked him in the stomach.270 Conversely, in Dandan v. Ashcroft, the Sev-
enth Circuit found that a three-day detention, accompanied by beatings that 
caused the applicant’s face to swell, did not compel a finding of persecution, 
even though the applicant received no food during his detention.271 Reaching a 
result comparable to Dandan, the Ninth Circuit in Gu v. Gonzales contradicted 
the persecution threshold it previously set in Guo.272 It found persecution was 
not compelled where authorities detained the applicant for three days and hit 
him ten times on the back with a rod.273 The applicant suffered pain from the 
blows, but aside from “temporary red marks,” he did not sustain any injuries.274 
Any attempt to synthesize the cases to identify a discernible pattern or 
threshold for persecutory conduct necessarily fails. Plotting the cases on a grid 
helps to illustrate: 














                                                        
269  Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition to detaining 
Guo, authorities forced him to renounce his Christian beliefs. Id. at 1203. Renouncing one’s 
faith or practicing in secret would create ongoing psychological harm. Nevertheless, the 
court in Guo did not ground at least one of its holdings on any such ongoing harm. Rather, 
the court found that the record “compels a finding that Mr. Guo was persecuted during his 
first detention.” Id. (emphasis added). 
270  Id. at 1197. 
271  Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 2003). 
272  Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2006). 
273  Id. at 1017–18. As in Guo, the harm endured by the applicant in Gu occurred against the 
backdrop of a request to sign an affidavit. Id. at 1018; Guo, 361 F.3d at 1197. 
274  Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018. The court’s attempt in Gu to distinguish it from Guo was incorrect 
because, although the court in Guo did note several instances of abuse, it found—as noted 
above—that the record compelled a finding of persecution based on Guo’s first detention. Id. 
at 1020; Guo, 361 F.3d at 1197–98, 1203. 
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The data points represent the duration and severity of harm experienced by 
the applicants in each of the above-discussed cases. Figure 1 demonstrates 
widely inconsistent persecution outcomes, even though the harm alleged by the 
applicants only concerned a single incident. Thus, after decades reviewing asy-
lum claims, courts cannot even consistently assess the most basic and straight-
forward type of harm—a single instance of abuse and detention. 
The duration data points for each physical harm and detention are taken di-
rectly from the cases. The plotted severity of the harms the applicants endured, 
however, is necessarily subject to interpretation. For example, reasonable 
minds could disagree about whether beatings that lead to facial swelling are 
moderately severe or highly severe (or somewhere in between). Despite the 
judgment call this study made when assessing harm severity, the data points are 
instructive for two reasons. First, adjudicators must always make judgment 
calls when assessing persecution claims. Just because harm’s severity can be 
gauged in different ways does not change the fact that adjudicators’ severity 
assessments can be the difference between a grant of asylum and deportation. 
Second, and more importantly, the severity calculations are proportional 
when compared to each other. Indeed, the detention unaccompanied by overt 
physical abuse in Bejko is less severe than the sandbag hits experienced by the 
applicant in Mihalev. Moving up the severity axis, the harm perpetrated against 
the applicant in Mihalev is less severe than the harms suffered by the applicants 
in Gu, Guo, and Dandan, who all experienced hits, kicks, and other blows that 
caused comparable injury. Finally, the harms endured in this trio of cases are 
proportionately less severe than the electric shocks administered to the appli-
cants in Khan and Quan, which are represented by the highest points on the se-
verity axis.275 
Residual harm should also be factored into the analysis to determine 
whether it impacts the inconsistency among the decisions. Figure 1, however, 
only depicts the harm experienced during the duration of the incident itself. It 
does not take into account physical symptoms that the applicants endured after 
the perpetrators released them. Such symptoms extend the duration of suffering 
caused by the harmful event. These cases do not indicate that any of the appli-
cants required medical attention or experienced significant residual harm.276 
                                                        
275  The severity of harm endured by the applicant in Quan is based on how the majority 
characterized the suffering, but the dissent did raise several interesting points about the true 
extent of harm suffered by the applicant. Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir. 
2005) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
276  Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that the applicant did 
not pursue medical treatment); Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the applicant did not need medical treatment and was able to make the three-to-four kil-
ometer trip home on foot); Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018 (noting that the applicant sustained tempo-
rary red marks and did not need medical attention); Quan, 428 F.3d at 888–89 (noting that 
the applicant suffered from headaches, weakness, and distress but did not report any result-
ing “medical attention or sustained injury”); Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 729 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (indicating that the applicant suffered no significant injury); Guo, 361 F.3d at 
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Thus, for purposes of illustration in Figure 2, the severity and duration of the 
residual physical harm experienced by the applicants during their recoveries 
can be quantified by assuming that as the severity of the initial injury increases, 
the duration and physical pain of the recovery time increases as well. Accord-
ingly, the residual pain and time that it would take to recover from beatings and 
electric shock would be greater than the recovery time required after getting hit 
with a bag of sand. Making such assumptions here is important because, in the 
absence of doing so, the true extent of physical pain suffered would be un-
derrepresented.277 Nevertheless, the fact that such assumptions must be made at 
all is indicative of a significant gap in the types of germane details seldom pro-
vided during asylum hearings. 
For each data point in Figure 2, the severity of harm has diminished to re-
flect the fact that the average level of harm experienced over the course of the 
event and recovery period is not as high as the level of harm experienced dur-
ing the event itself.278 The overall amount of suffering, however, is higher be-
cause the duration is longer. Including the residual harm experienced during 
recovery time does not impact the severity of a particular harmful incident vis-
à-vis the harms in the other cases. Consequently, the persecution outcome in-
consistencies remain. 












                                                                                                                                
1203 (mentioning that the applicant was persecuted “during” the detention without reference 
to subsequent ailments); Dandan, 339 F.3d at 574 (stating that the known repercussions of 
the applicant’s beatings were that “his face became swollen”). 
277  It would also skew the relative severity of the physical harm when compared to the se-
verity of psychological harms discussed infra Part III.B.2–3. 
278  The proportional extent to which the average harm has been lowered is also subject to 
interpretation, but, as with the assessments of harm in Figure 1, the overall level of harm has 
been lowered in proportion to the initial severity of the event and its duration. 
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2. Psychological Harm: Single Fear-Inducing Event 
As noted above, one of the categories of cases universally found to estab-
lish persecution is “sufficient harm preceding a substantiated flight precipita-
tor.”279 In the absence of sufficient preceding harm, however, the appellate 
courts have reached divergent conclusions when assessing whether the fear in-
duced by a flight precipitator necessarily rises to the level of persecution. 
Forced conscription cases are particularly apt to illustrate the inconsistencies 
between analogous fact patterns. In Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, the applicant fled the 
country shortly after he received a military draft notice.280 According to the ap-
plicant’s uncontradicted statement, the government only sent draft notices to 
individuals opposed to the government.281 The Seventh Circuit concluded that 
the applicant’s circumstances established that he was persecuted even though 
he “was not exposed to the hazards of military duty.”282 The court noted, 
“[b]eing driven out of one’s country is another crossing of the line that sepa-
rates mere discrimination from persecution.”283 
The Ninth Circuit in Sangha v. INS held that a comparable flight precipita-
tor necessarily established persecution.284 Armed men came to the applicant’s 
home, beat up his father, and gave him three weeks to join their cause and fight 
for them.285 The applicant traveled to a different part of the country, but the 
armed men sent an additional threat.286 Consequently, the applicant fled the 
county.287 The court concisely held this conduct was “sufficient to show perse-
cution.”288 The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in Islami v. Gonza-
les.289 Assessing the applicant’s claim that he similarly fled the country after 
receiving a draft notice,290 the court held that the applicant’s “fear of retribution 
for refusing to participate in a military known to perpetrate crimes against hu-
manity . . . rose to the level of past persecution.”291 
In contrast to these holdings, the Ninth Circuit in Zehatye v. Gonzales held 
that the record did not compel a finding of past persecution even though the ap-
                                                        
279  See supra Part III.A.4. 
280  Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2004). 
281  Id. 
282  Id. at 756. 
283  Id. 
284  Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486–87 (9th Cir. 1997). 
285  Id. at 1486. 
286  Id. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. at 1487. 
289  Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 397 (2d Cir. 2005). 
290  Id. at 393. While the case mentions additional forms of harassment experienced by the 
applicant before fleeing, the court did not factor them into its persecution holding. Id. at 397. 
291  Id. at 397. The cases cited by the court in support of this proposition concerned a well-
founded fear of persecution rather than being persecuted itself. Id. (citing, among others, 
Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 126 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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plicant fled the country after the government tried to forcibly conscript her.292 
Specifically, local authorities sent the applicant a letter that indicated she had 
“one week to prepare to enter the army.”293 In Tobon-Marin v. Mukasey, the 
court upheld the Board’s determination that the applicant did not establish he 
was persecuted when he fled about one week after a rebel group tried to con-
script him to fight for its cause.294 The court found that the record did not com-
pel a finding of persecution, even though the applicant learned that the rebels 
murdered a third party who refused to join their ranks.295 In other cases, liti-
gants did not even bother to assert that an attempted recruitment itself estab-
lished past persecution, recognizing that its minimal severity level relegates the 
inquiry to what may happen if the applicant is deported back to the home coun-
try; that is, whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.296 
Figure 3 illustrates the courts’ largely inconsistent assessments of whether ap-
plicants established they were persecuted because they feared conscription. 














The case facts depict comparable levels of psychological harm with the 
possible exceptions of Sangha and Tobon-Marin, where the levels of harm 
were slightly elevated because one applicant watched authorities beat his fa-
ther297 and the other learned that rebels murdered at least one person who re-
                                                        
292  Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2006). The divergence between 
this case and cases equating a fear of conscription to being persecuted is even more stark be-
cause the applicant in Zehatye also experienced economic harm. Id. at 1186. 
293  Id. at 1184. 
294  Tobon-Marin v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 28, 30–32 (1st Cir. 2008). 
295  Id. at 30. 
296  See, e.g., Mekhoukh, 358 F.3d at 123 (noting that the applicant did not even allege that he 
was persecuted in the past for evading military service); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) 
(2014) (discussing the well-founded fear standard). 
297  Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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fused to fight for the rebels’ cause.298 In several of these cases, the courts did 
not even specify the precise time lapse between the threat and the date when the 
applicant fled.299 Their failure to do so minimizes the fact that the overall level 
of harm endured increases when an applicant experiences it over a greater dura-
tion of time. Regardless of the exact duration of psychological harm experi-
enced before fleeing, the outcome discrepancies highlight another deficiency in 
many courts’ decisionmaking processes for persecution assessments. These 
cases do not concern the actual suffering the applicants could endure if they 
had been conscripted to fight for a government or guerrilla group.300 Rather, the 
harm was limited to the fear induced for a short period of time before the appli-
cants decided to flee. Thus, it appears that some decisions conflate past suffer-
ing with prospective harm.301 Nevertheless, regardless of whether courts con-
flate past and future harm, fail to appreciate the actual extent of suffering, or 
base their assessments on a tertiary reason, the outcomes themselves are equal-
ly inconsistent. 
3. Psychological Harm: Continuous Fear-Inducing Events 
In many cases, applicants allege a pattern of psychological harm perpetrat-
ed against them over a significant period of time. In these cases, the applicants 
do not experience any physical harm, either because the perpetrators have not 
acted on their threats or the applicants successfully evaded the assailants’ ef-
forts to physically harm them. As with psychological harm stemming from a 
single threat, appellate court holdings diverge in their assessment of whether 
continuous psychological harm is severe enough to rise to the level of past per-
secution. 
In Marcos v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that years of threats against 
the applicant failed to compel the conclusion that he was persecuted.302 The ap-
plicant, a radio operator for the military, received death threats over the radio 
for several years from a guerrilla group.303 The medium then changed to tele-
phone calls and in-person threats.304 Although the military provided him with 
security in his office, the guerrilla group would approach him at the times when 
                                                        
298  Tobon-Marin, 512 F.3d at 30. 
299  As such, some of the duration numbers are estimations. Nevertheless, these approxima-
tions do not impact the inconsistencies depicted. 
300  See, e.g., Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011) (evaluating harm the 
applicant experienced after being conscripted). 
301  Courts have not consistently discussed the significance of the time the applicant re-
mained in the country. Compare Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 
2007) (“[T]hreats of murder would fit neatly under [persecution’s] carapace.”), with De 
Oliveira v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2008) (faulting the applicant for remain-
ing in the country for four months after assailants threatened him). 
302  Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 
303  Id. at 1115–16. 
304  Id. at 1116. 
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no security was present.305 As a result, the applicant stopped traveling outside 
his town for work.306 Although the frequency of the threats diminished over 
time, they continued until the applicant departed his home country.307 
In Lim v. INS, the applicant appeared on a “death list” and subsequently re-
ceived multiple death threats because he testified against a revolutionary group 
opposed to the government.308 He used police protection and restricted his trav-
el for two years while the threats continued.309 “[T]o escape the threats,” the 
applicant quit the police force.310 The applicant hired a personal bodyguard to 
protect him because he continued to receive threats.311 Throughout the follow-
ing years, three of the applicant’s former colleagues who also testified were 
murdered, and the applicant observed that assailants had started to follow 
him.312 Consequently, the applicant fled the country.313 Based on these facts, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the applicant failed to establish that he was 
persecuted.314 
The same court reached a different conclusion in Ruano v. Ashcroft, where 
it found that a series of threats did compel the conclusion that the applicant was 
persecuted.315 Over a six-year period, a guerrilla group sent the applicant thirty 
to thirty-five death threats.316 During the last four years, armed men would trail 
the applicant and occasionally try to accost him.317 They would also look for 
him at his house, but he always managed to escape.318 The applicant avoided 
the assailants by changing his modes of transportation.319 While the applicant 
was never personally injured, he heard that the guerrillas had murdered other 
members of the political organization to which he belonged.320 The court found 
the applicant’s circumstances more severe than those experienced by the appli-
cant in Lim because the applicant in Ruano was “closely confronted” by men 
who were visibly armed and these men also confronted the applicant’s family 
to try to learn his whereabouts.321 
                                                        
305  Id. 
306  Id. 
307  Id. 
308  Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2000). 
309  Id. at 932–33. 
310  Id. at 933. 
311  Id. 
312  Id. 
313  Id. 
314  Id. at 936. 
315  Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1157–60 (9th Cir. 2002). 
316  Id. at 1157. 
317  Id. at 1158. 
318  Id. 
319  Id. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. at 1160. 
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The court reached the same conclusion in Salazar-Paucar v. INS, where a 
guerrilla organization repeatedly threatened the applicant with death because he 
was elected to the equivalent of a town councilman.322 For months, the guerrilla 
group conveyed the death threats though a middleman and by painting them in 
the town square.323 They also killed the town’s mayor, who had served as the 
applicant’s boss.324 About a year into his term, while the applicant was on a 
trip, guerrillas came to town with a list of targets that the applicant presumed he 
was on. These guerrillas located eight people on the list and executed them.325 
Because the guerrillas could not find the applicant, they beat his parents.326 The 
applicant subsequently fled to a city with his family, where he lived without in-
cident for over a year.327 Then, he discovered a death threat painted on the wall 
of his house and soon learned that two of the others who were elected to the 
town councilman equivalent had been killed.328 As a result, the applicant fled 
the country.329 The court found the record compelled the conclusion that he was 
persecuted due to the death threats, the murder of other politicians, and the 
physical harm to his family.330 
The juxtaposition of the cases that did and did not find past persecution 
compelled highlights important points about the way to measure both the dis-
tinction in the severity of harm caused by threats and how the level of psycho-
logical harm compares to other forms of harm. As to the extent of psychologi-
cal harm, in all of the cases, the applicants experienced recurring death threats 
over a period of years. The courts accepted the legitimacy of the threats in each 
of the cases as well.331 Additionally, all of the applicants demonstrated their 
fear by altering their behavior in response to the threats, including changing 
movement patterns, restricting movement, obtaining security protection, or re-
locating entirely. Others were killed in each of the cases as well. 
These comparable incidents and the courts’ reasoning establish a baseline 
level of suffering necessarily experienced by all the applicants.332 In both Mar-
cos and Lim, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the circumstances did not 
                                                        
322  Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002). 
323  Id. 
324  Id. 
325  Id. at 1071–72. 
326  Id. at 1071. 
327  Id. at 1072. 
328  Id. 
329  Id. 
330  Id. at 1075. 
331  Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (labeling the threats “credi-
ble”); Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (presuming legitimacy by vir-
tue of the ultimate holding); Salazar-Paucar, 281 F.3d at 1075 (discussing the evidence sup-
porting legitimacy); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
applicant’s fear was “well-founded” based on previous threats). 
332  The baseline level of harm is germane because it impacts the proportional increase in 
suffering that the applicants purportedly experienced in the cases where the courts did find 
persecution compelled. 
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compel a finding of past persecution, they did compel the conclusion that the 
applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted.333 In holding that the 
applicants justifiably feared harm or death if returned to their home countries, 
the courts acknowledged that the events described by the applicants caused fear 
when they were living in their home countries and that the assailants had the 
will and ability to carry out the threats. After all, it would be impossible to find 
that the applicants reasonably feared prospective harm on the basis of circum-
stances that caused no fear while they were happening.334 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit panels believed that the applicants were liv-
ing in their home countries for years under the fear of knowing that serious 
harm or death was, at the very least, a possibility. A true understanding of the 
psychological anguish caused by such constant fear requires a momentary di-
gression into the shoes of an asylum applicant: picture your daily existence for 
a number of consecutive years under the cloud of a seemingly legitimate belief 
that outsiders want to kill you and have the means to carry out their wishes. 
This scenario is what each of the fact patterns dictates by virtue of the determi-
nation in each that the circumstances necessarily establish past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution.335 
Because the court panels diverged in whether a finding of persecution was 
compelled in each of the cases, these similar circumstances and levels of suffer-
ing, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to compel such a finding in this 
case sample. Thus, the distinctions between the cases must be examined to try 
to discern if there exists a consistent harm threshold among the divergent case 
outcomes. In Ruano, the assailants at times got closer to the applicant than in 
Lim, the applicant could see that the assailants brandished weapons, and the as-
sailants had contact with the applicant’s family.336 Nevertheless, the applicant 
in Lim was being followed as well, and the applicant’s belief that these men de-
sired to kill him makes the actual observation of a gun nominal. The contact 
with the Ruano applicant’s family, however, could certainly be particularly 
troubling. Similarly, regarding Salazar-Paucar, the fact that the assailants in-
jured the applicant’s parents can increase the psychological harm the applicant 
experienced in a way not seen in either Lim or Marcos.337 Consequently, the 
                                                        
333  Marcos, 410 F.3d at 1119; Lim, 224 F.3d at 934–36. 
334  The absence of a harm crescendo could be a potentially mitigating factor, but there is no 
indication that the courts factored such a consideration into their decisions. Indeed, in Mar-
cos the threat frequency diminished toward the end of the applicant’s time in his home coun-
try and the court still believed he established a well-founded fear of persecution. Marcos, 
410 F.3d at 1116, 1120. 
335  For an in-depth analysis of the possible meanings of “fear” in the well-founded fear in-
quiry, see James C. Hathaway & William S. Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element in the Ref-
ugee Convention’s Requirement of “Well-Founded Fear”?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505 (2005). 
336  Ruano, 301 F.3d at 1160. 
337  Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Ladha v. INS, 
215 F.3d 889, 902 (9th Cir. 2000) (factoring harm to family members into its persecution 
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panels that found the applicant was persecuted were able to point to some evi-
dence of increased harm. Do these differences establish a threshold for deter-
mining that such conduct compels the conclusion that an applicant was perse-
cuted? Figure 4 is instructive:338 














The harm measurements for each case represent an estimated339 average 
severity level over the duration of the harm endured by each applicant.340 The 
severity level is based on averaging the higher suffering caused by actual 
threats and harm to third parties with the lower baseline psychological turmoil 
applicants experienced between the more tangible incidents. Even assuming 
arguendo a higher harm severity in the cases where the courts found persecu-
tion compelled, the cases do not appear to yield consistent persecution out-
comes when assessing the overall amount of harm experienced by the appli-
cants because of differences in duration. Indeed, the applicant in Salazar-
Paucar might have experienced harm greater than the applicant in Marcos dur-
                                                                                                                                
finding); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 265 (2013 ed.) (re-
viewing when harm to family members is relevant to being persecuted). 
338  The severity of harm that results from the threats is based on averaging the experiences 
of the applicants throughout the duration of their time in their home countries. It takes into 
account the peaks and lulls of the harm endured. Thus, for example, while the psychological 
harm would spike after a threat escalation or learning that a similarly-situated person has 
been murdered, the harm experienced would diminish during periods of relative tranquility. 
Consequently, a more refined graph depiction would make each case’s harm measurement 
resemble the output of a cardiograph, but an in-depth discussion of persecution’s temporal 
dimensions is beyond the scope of this article. 
339  The estimation is based on the level of detail provided in each case about the harms en-
dured. 
340  See supra Part II.B. (discussing the study’s methodology for measuring harm). 
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ing the time when assailants victimized him, but the Marcos applicant endured 
psychological anguish that lasted for five years longer.341 
The heightened complexity of these continuous psychological harms make 
an assessment of their consistency less concrete than the single instances of 
harm previously analyzed. Nevertheless, while the courts’ holdings regarding 
continuous psychological harm do appear inconsistent, comparing them to the 
courts’ single-incident persecution assessments leaves no room to question the 
palpable divergence in outcome. Indeed, in Marcos and Lim, the psychological 
harm lasted for years, but the courts determined that the respective records did 
not compel a finding of persecution.342 Conversely, even though the psycholog-
ical trauma in Islami, Miljkovic, and Sangha took place over the span of ap-
proximately several weeks, each decision found the record compelled the con-
clusion that the applicant was persecuted.343 Figure 5 depicts the 
inconsistencies for psychological harm, generously assuming the applicants in 
the single-incident, persecution-compelled cases suffered a level of harm com-
parable to the applicants in the continuous psychological harm cases. 
















                                                        
341  Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (eight years); Salazar-
Paucar, 281 F.3d at 1071–72 (three years). 
342  Marcos, 410 F.3d at 1119; Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000). 
343  Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 397–98 (2d Cir. 2005) (rendering ambiguous the exact 
time between learning of conscription and fleeing); Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754, 756 
(7th Cir. 2004) (making clear that the applicant fled shortly after he received the draft no-
tice); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486–87 (9th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the applicant 
fled several weeks after he received the draft notice). 
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Comparing the continuous psychological harm cases to the cases that con-
cerned single instances of physical abuse and detention also yields questionable 
outcome divergences: 
FIGURE 6: COMBINED CONTINUOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM AND SINGLE INSTANCE OF 














Physical harm may be construed as a central aspect of what it means to be 
persecuted,344 but it is dubious to conclude that several hits and kicks during a 
detention lasting little more than one day is more severe than living under a 
substantiated threat of death for many years.345 
4. Other Harm Inconsistencies 
The inconsistencies among appellate court persecution assessments are not 
limited to those falling within one of the preceding three categories. While the 
panoply of divergent outcomes is too numerous to mention in full, a few final 
comparisons will serve to round out the prior sections. In Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 
for example, the court found the following circumstances insufficient to compel 
a finding of persecution: a longstanding pattern of physical harm and murder 
against the applicant’s family members, along with more recent “death threats, 
beating, and misappropriation of property” directed at the applicant and her 
husband.346 Conversely, in Del Carmen Molina v. INS, the court found that the 
                                                        
344  Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that a “lack of physi-
cal harm” to the applicant was a main reason for not finding persecution compelled); Chand 
v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Physical harm has consistently been treated as 
persecution.”). 
345  Compare Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (short detention with 
physical harm), with Lim, 224 F.3d at 932–33 (longer period of psychological suffering). 
346  Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 188, 191–92 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Nzeve v. Holder, 
582 F.3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that threats and a beating did not compel a 
finding of persecution); De Oliveira v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding 
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record compelled the conclusion that the applicant was persecuted based on 
previous killings and harms to family members and two unfulfilled threats 
against her.347 
In Ladha v. INS, the court determined that a combination of physical harm 
and harm to others compelled a finding of past persecution.348 A similar com-
bination of harm directed at the applicant and family members did not compel a 
finding of past persecution in Cabas v. Holder.349 In both Ladha and Cabas, the 
assailants physically beat the applicants.350 The applicant in Cabas, however, 
sustained the more severe injury. The applicants in both cases also suffered ad-
ditional threats and learned second-hand that assailants threatened and injured 
members of their immediate family.351 Consequently, the applicants did not 
suffer appreciably different levels of harm, but the court only found that the 
facts necessarily established persecution in one of the cases. 
Guo v. Ashcroft and Bocova v. Gonzales provide another example of 
courts’ inconsistent holdings. In Guo, the court found persecution compelled 
where assailants administered several hits and kicks over one and a half 
days.352 Conversely, in Bocova, the court found the circumstances did not com-
pel a finding of persecution where the applicant was “interrogated, beaten, and 
threatened with death” during a two-day detention, and then, about two years 
later, was again detained, threatened, and beaten by authorities until he lost 
consciousness.353 Finally, while the minimal injuries caused to the applicant in 
Mihalev v. Ashcroft during a ten-day detention compelled a finding that he was 
persecuted,354 persecution was not compelled in Nelson v. INS, where assailants 
physically abused the applicant during three incidents of solitary confinement 
and the applicant further experienced surveillance, harassment, and stops and 
searches.355 Accordingly, as demonstrated by the case comparisons in this sec-
tion and the previous sections, the appellate courts diverge considerably in the 
types of harm they find necessarily establish persecution. 
                                                                                                                                
insufficient to establish persecution multiple death threats directed at the applicant and his 
family). 
347  Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1999). 
348  Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 902 (9th Cir. 2000). 
349  Cabas v. Holder, 695 F.3d 169, 174 (1st Cir. 2012). 
350  Id.; Ladha, 215 F.3d at 902. 
351  Cabas, 695 F.3d at 172; Ladha, 215 F.3d at 902. 
352  Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004). 
353  Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 261 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that authorities immedi-
ately had to take the applicant to get medical treatment after the second incident). 
354  Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004). 
355  Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 2000); cf. Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 37–
40 (1st Cir. 2009) (relaying a series of incidents, including the forced drinking of 
wastewater, that did not compel a finding that the applicant had been persecuted). 
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IV. DIVERGENCE AND CAUSATION 
Two interrelated questions emerge from the inconsistent persecution out-
comes: what are the causes of these troubling discrepancies and how can they 
be minimized? Part IV addresses these questions. It examines whether certain 
judges or circuits are more likely to find persecution compelled. After review-
ing whether there exists intra- and inter-circuit patterns to the disparities, Part 
IV will discuss why a significant cause of the outcome inconsistencies concerns 
how adjudicators assess harm and what it means to be persecuted. Additionally, 
Part IV will offer several preliminary proposals to remedy the inconsistent per-
secution decisions. 
A. Deviations Between Judges 
The likelihood of applicants successfully establishing they either experi-
enced persecution or fear being persecuted should not depend on the composi-
tion of the judicial panel they happen to draw. This study sought to determine 
whether the particular appellate judges assigned to review an applicant’s asy-
lum claim could impact the applicant’s likelihood of success. To assess whether 
the judicial panel could have contributed to the outcome divergences, this study 
tabulated the judges in Ninth Circuit cases that decided specifically whether an 
applicant established that the facts compelled a finding of persecution.356 
The low vote count renders some of the results statistically insignificant. 
Indeed, for many of the judges with remand rates slightly above or below fifty 
percent, a difference in one or two cases would significantly impact the per-
centage of cases where they found persecution compelled. Nevertheless, for 
many of the judges on the high and low end of remand rates, the data is instruc-
tive and, at the very least, should serve as a springboard for future research. 
There are several reasons to not discount the remand rate disparities de-
picted in the data. For one, many of the judges at the extreme ends of the spec-
trum reviewed more than five cases—most reviewed between eight and nine-
teen. Several of the percentage distinctions are quite staggering. In particular, 
Judges O, P, Q, R, and S found persecution compelled at least eighty-five per-
cent of the time while Judge A only found persecution compelled in one of the 
nine cases reviewed. 
Additionally, to compile the initial assessment of the cases in the findings 
section of this article, this study required a thorough review and assessment of 
the cases that form the data points for Table 1. The facts in these cases and the 
tenor of the opinions make clear that an applicant would benefit considerably if 
one of several judges were assigned to the panel reviewing the applicant’s 
case—that is, a review of the individual cases demonstrates that Table 1 accu-
rately reflects the outlier status of several judges. 
                                                        
356  The Ninth Circuit was chosen because it reviewed the highest number of cases. For the 
full list of Ninth Circuit judges and their votes, see Supplement Table S3, 
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/. 
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A Democrat 9  1 (11%) 
B Republican 5  1 (20%) 
C Democrat 9  3 (33%) 
D Republican 5  2 (40%) 
E Democrat 5  2 (40%) 
F Democrat 6  3 (50%) 
G Republican 7  4 (57%) 
H Democrat 7  4 (57%) 
I Democrat 5  3 (60%) 
J Democrat 5  3 (60%) 
K Republican 6  4 (67%) 
L Republican 10  7 (70%) 
M Democrat 5  4 (80%) 
N Democrat 5  4 (80%) 
O Democrat 13  11 (85%) 
P Democrat 19  17 (89%) 
Q Democrat 10  9 (90%) 
R Democrat 8  8 (100%) 
S Democrat 5  5 (100%) 
Aside from the percentage of persecution cases where a judge voted to re-
mand, Table 1 shows that certain judges sat on a panel that specifically ren-
dered judgment on the persecution-compelled question considerably more often 
than his or her colleagues. The number of votes cast by Judge P is particularly 
notable. The implications of the distinction in volume requires further study, 
but this article hypothesizes that certain judges are more likely to publish their 
persecution decisions. As such, even if these judges do not review considerably 
more persecution determinations than their colleagues, their opinions dispro-
portionately influence what it means to be persecuted within their circuit.359 
The seven judges most likely to find that the facts compelled a finding of 
persecution were all appointed by presidents who were Democrats. Neverthe-
less, on the whole, the limited data does not appear to depict any systematic 
distinction in case outcomes based on the appointing president’s political affili-
ation. At most, the data supports the possibility that presidents who are Demo-
crats are more likely to appoint outlier judges. 
                                                        
357  The political party of the president who appointed each judge. 
358  The votes counted are (1) those where a judge either authored or agreed with the majori-
ty opinion regarding persecution; and (2) those where the judge dissented specifically be-
cause he or she believed that the facts either compelled a finding of persecution or did not do 
so. Dissenting votes based on other considerations are not included. 
359  See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the 
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 71–75 (2004) (summarizing several criticisms of un-
published decisions). 
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B. Deviations Between Circuits 
In addition to the composition of specific judicial panels, this study as-
sessed whether the particular circuit that reviews an applicant’s persecution 
claim could impact the applicant’s likelihood of success. In a previous study, 
Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag 
measured appellate courts’ remand rates for asylum claims decided between 
2004 and 2005.360 Their results demonstrated notable disparities, with circuit 
remand rates ranging from 1.9 percent to 36.1 percent.361 These disparities, 
however, were based on remand rates for any substantive issue; the professors 
did not dissect the specific reasons why a court decided to remand an asylum 
case.362 
To determine whether the same inter-circuit discrepancies would exist for 
persecution assessments specifically, this article’s study compared the deci-
sions of the First and Ninth Circuits. Specifically, it tabulated all of the First 
and Ninth Circuit opinions where a panel explicitly decided whether the harm 
proffered by the applicant necessarily established persecution.363 These two cir-
cuits were chosen because they have the highest volume of published cases that 
decided the persecution-compelled question.364 







Persecution Not Compelled 
First 66  3 (5%)  63 (95%) 
Ninth 78  51 (65%)  27 (35%) 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the facts compelled a finding of persecution 
substantially more often than the First Circuit. This significant disparity sup-
ports the conclusion that the geographic region where asylum applicants’ per-
secution claims are adjudicated may affect the outcome of the case.365 
                                                        
360  Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 26, at 362. 
361  Id. 
362  Id. at 403. Additionally, their study also assessed unpublished decisions. Id. at 404. 
363  The inter-circuit comparison did not include asylum decisions where a panel remanded 
the case because of one of the procedural flaws that this study discarded for a reason dis-
cussed in the methodology section. 
364  Even though most of its decisions are unpublished, the Ninth Circuit reviews significant-
ly more asylum cases than the First Circuit. See Guendelsberger, 2012 Asylum Statistics, su-
pra note 16; Guendelsberger, 2011 Asylum Statistics, supra note 16. To see a list of First and 
Ninth Circuit cases addressing the persecution-compelled question, see Supplement Table S4 
(Ninth) and Schedule S5 (First), http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss1/6/. 
365  This study also tabulated the countries where the applicants claimed they were persecut-
ed. The results suggest that these distinctions do not likely contribute in a significant way to 
the outcome discrepancies between the First and Ninth Circuits. In most instances, the cir-
cuits assessed a comparable amount of cases from various regions. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, did review significantly more claims for asylum from applicants who fled countries in 
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The results are troubling because persecution outcomes should not so sig-
nificantly depend on an applicant’s location. The outcome disparity between 
the two circuits would likely narrow if unpublished decisions were factored in-
to the results. For the persecution-compelled question, however, the terse anal-
ysis provided in many unpublished opinions could make it difficult to deter-
mine the specific reason why a panel decided to remand an asylum claim.366 
Assume arguendo that the reasons for remand in unpublished decisions are not 
ambiguous and including such unpublished opinions would narrow the out-
come divergence. Even if this were the case, the very fact that circuits would 
diverge so drastically in their use of unpublished opinions is itself problematic 
because it would likely skew a circuit’s persecution jurisprudence. 
Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag attributed the inter-
circuit discrepancies they found in their study to “differing attitudes that the 
judges in these circuits have, in the aggregate, with respect to asylum seekers’ 
claims, or at least the differing degrees of their skepticism about the adequacy 
of Board and immigration judge decision making.”367 Attitudinal differences 
are certainly a contributing factor. Nevertheless, at least for the persecution-
compelled question, the cases reviewed in this article’s study yielded several 
more tangible causes for the inter-circuit discrepancies, as well as the discrep-
ancies between individual cases. These causes relate to how courts assess and 
measure harm. 
To be sure, a court’s attitude and harm assessment are not mutually exclu-
sive. Indeed, a court’s attitude toward asylum seekers can impact the way that a 
court views and judges the harm alleged by an asylum applicant. Thus, without 
discounting the significance of attitudinal divergences, the next section will re-
view the tangible harm assessment and measurement issues that have contribut-
ed to the divergent persecution outcomes documented in the findings section 
above. 
C. Measuring Harm 
The cases examined in this study show that much of the disparity among 
appellate court persecution decisions can be attributed to the way courts inter-
pret the meaning of persecution, and how they characterize and measure harm. 
This section will review these causes of outcome discrepancies and provide 
several preliminary observations for what can be done to mitigate them.368 
                                                                                                                                
Central America. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed nine asylum claims from citizens 
of Fiji while the First Circuit did not consider any. 
366  See, e.g., Baroi v. INS, 22 F. App’x 775 (9th Cir. 2001). 
367  Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 26, at 364. 
368  The suggestions are general and preliminary because the data yield several additional 
areas of study that would aid more specific solutions. 
15 NEV. L.J. 142 - REMPELL.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
196 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:142 
1. The Systematic Harm Question 
Among the appellate courts, there is a fundamental disagreement about the 
importance of harm being perpetrated systematically in order to be persecutory. 
The First Circuit’s reasoning in Khan—where electric shock did not compel a 
finding that assailants persecuted the applicant369—exemplifies its focus on 
systematic conduct rather than an “isolated” event or even multiple fairly se-
vere events that are not perceived as interrelated.370 Under this rubric, a lack of 
systematic conduct can preclude a finding of persecution when the harm would 
otherwise appear to be sufficiently severe. For this reason, within the categories 
of cases that the reviewed courts universally regard as sufficiently severe, near-
ly all of them concern repeated abuse over a substantial period of time.371 In 
several instances, other circuits have followed the First Circuit’s belief that sys-
tematic mistreatment is a condition precedent to establishing persecution.372 By 
contrast, as demonstrated by the outcomes in several of the cases described 
above, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits do not regularly follow compa-
rably narrow parameters,373 nor do most of the other appellate courts.374 The 
incredible outcome divergence between the First and Ninth Circuits seen in Ta-
ble 2 is indicative of this fundamental disagreement. 
The fact that decades of adjudications involving over a million asylum 
claims have failed to yield a consistent approach on the systematic harm ques-
tion is nothing short of astounding.375 It is well within the Attorney General’s 
authority to lay claim to such an important question—one that is so fundamen-
tal to determining what it truly means to be persecuted.376 A more thorough 
discussion of whether adjudicators should require that applicants experience 
                                                        
369  Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 576–77 (1st Cir. 2008). 
370  Wiratama v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]solated beatings, even when ra-
ther severe, do not establish systematic mistreatment needed to show persecution.”). The 
First Circuit has, on occasion, seemingly softened its language on systematic mistreatment as 
a prerequisite. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (couching it as a fac-
tor). 
371  See supra Part III.A. 
372  See, e.g., Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Bocova, 412 F.3d 
at 263) (distinguishing “systematic” and “isolated incidents”); Kalaj v. Gonzales, 137 F. 
App’x 851, 854 (6th Cir. 2005) (crediting the immigration judge’s determination that the 
incidents were not systematic). 
373  Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2005) (chastising decisions by immi-
gration judges that purport to require systematic conduct); Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 
1203 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a short detention and minor beating “compels a finding 
that Mr. Guo was persecuted during his first detention” (emphasis added)). 
374  See, e.g., Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing persecu-
tion based on a single incident). 
375  At most, courts have inferred a systematic requirement from Board decisions that have 
alluded to its relative importance. See, e.g., Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 (citing for support In re 
O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (B.I.A. 1998)). 
376  See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009) (noting the scope of the Board’s au-
thority to interpret the “statutory meaning of ‘persecution’ ”). 
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systematic harm is beyond the scope of this article. The systematic question is 
one among many points that collectively comprise the temporal dimension of 
persecution assessments. The temporal dimension concerns the significance of 
the moment in time when a particular event takes place, how it factors into the 
applicant’s overall experience in the home country prior to fleeing, and how the 
surrounding context of the harm impacts its initial and residual severity. Given 
the complexities of this issue, a more in-depth inquiry will have to be the sub-
ject of a future endeavor. As a general observation from cases where adjudica-
tors impose a systematic harm requirement, it appears these decisions constrict 
too narrowly the number of applicants who should be eligible for asylum relief. 
Applicants can experience multiple severe harms on account of protected 
grounds that warrant protection even without assailants perpetrating the harms 
systematically. 
2. Normative Thresholds 
Even in those circuits that do not require systematic abuse, the results of 
this study show that courts do not consistently determine when harm is severe 
enough to cross the persecutory threshold. The discussion of this study’s find-
ings axiomatically points to inconsistent assessments and interpretations of the 
requisite harm severity threshold as a root cause of the inconsistencies. Courts 
and scholars regularly caution against the creation of prescribed harm thresh-
olds because the meaning of persecution is constantly evolving and the nuances 
within specific claims purportedly make generalizations impractical.377 
The often fact-intensive nature of persecution inquiries, however, should 
not act as a shield to prevent the creation of general severity principles, by 
means of regulation or adjudication.378 Immigration agencies could provide 
guiding principles to which appellate courts would be required to defer.379 This 
study’s assessment of the persecution case law points to two instances where 
such guiding principles would be warranted and practical. The first concerns 
circumstances where the outcome discrepancies are irrefutably apparent. For 
example, this study reviewed inconsistent psychological harm assessments and 
measurements that were divergent enough to warrant general guidance. There 
is no reason why several weeks of psychological suffering should necessarily 
qualify as persecution while several years of comparable or greater psychologi-
                                                        
377  See Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 63 (1993) (noting the “endless variety of 
situations the term [persecution] might cover”). 
378  For cases that highlight the distinction between general guiding principles and pure ques-
tions of fact, see Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 591 (6th Cir. 2007) (refusing to defer to 
Board credibility decisions when the inconsistencies cited do not enhance the applicants’ 
asylum claims); Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). 
379  See Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “as the Attor-
ney General’s delegate,” the Board has “primary responsibility for defining key terms in the 
immigration statute that the statutes themselves do not define, such as ‘persecution’ ”). 
15 NEV. L.J. 142 - REMPELL.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
198 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:142 
cal harm does not.380 Second, guidance is warranted for comparable harms that 
applicants regularly proffer in support of their claims. For instance, is it suffi-
cient to sustain blows to the head that render one unconscious? Is a two-week 
detention with minimal harm enough? Decisions based on these types of ques-
tions appear frequently enough to warrant greater consistency.381 
This article is not suggesting reform that would base persecutory harm as-
sessments on generic tables and grids as seen in Social Security disability 
claims.382 Moreover, for asylum applicants with ulterior motives, overly pre-
established harm severity thresholds could provide a clearer path to game the 
system—a problem which exists in the limited areas of asylum law where the 
INA specifically prescribes a set path to establishing persecution.383 Neverthe-
less, the desire to avoid any sort of specificity has inhibited consistent assess-
ments of similar harms and symptoms that appear in numerous cases. 
3. Requisite Level of Detail 
In addition to differing assessments of persecution’s harm threshold in 
general, the cases reviewed for this study show that courts require applicants to 
provide varying amounts of detail about the harm they experienced. The diver-
gence in required detail can affect the likelihood that a panel will decide to re-
mand an asylum case. In some instances, appellate courts held that the record 
compelled a finding of persecution even though the applicant alleged he or she 
was simply beaten.384 Several cases held that the record compelled the conclu-
sion that the applicant was persecuted without any specification of the harm 
that led to that conclusion.385 Conversely, other decisions determined that ap-
plicants’ general harm descriptions were too vague to compel a finding of per-
secution or, at the very least, served as a negative factor to granting a petition 
for review.386 
                                                        
380  Compare Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2004) (persecution based on 
weeks of psychological harm), with Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (no per-
secution despite years of psychological harm). 
381  The answers to these questions, of course, are axiomatically linked to the systematic 
question and other contextual considerations. 
382  See Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadver-
sary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2003) (describing the disability determination process). 
383  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (stating that applicants forced to undergo an abortion or 
sterilization satisfy the definition of a “refugee”); Joseph Goldstein & Kirk Semple, Law 
Firms Are Accused of Aiding False Asylum Claims for Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, 
at A28. 
384  See, e.g., Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 902 (9th Cir. 2000); Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 
F.3d 1156, 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that repeated “beatings” over a ten-month 
period established that the applicant was persecuted). 
385  See, e.g., Begzatowski v. INS, 278 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 2002). 
386  See, e.g., Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 525, 535 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the appli-
cant only provided “scant details”); Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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While greater detail would appear important to properly assessing the ex-
tent of harm endured (and hence rendering sound judgments),387 at the very 
least adjudicators must approach the issue consistently. The immigration judges 
within EOIR are responsible for adjudicating tens of thousands of asylum cases 
every year.388 Mixed messages from the appellate courts undermine immigra-
tion judges’ understanding of the level of detail they must look for when they 
evaluate harm. The conflicting signals also inhibit attorneys’ understanding of 
the type of information they must elicit from their clients and introduce into the 
record through testimony or written documentation. While the appellate courts 
must be mindful to consistently require comparable levels of detail from appli-
cants, ultimately the responsibility for a consistent standard lies with the Attor-
ney General. 
4. Harm Proxies 
The lack of sufficient detail within many asylum claims leads adjudicators 
to infer the extent of suffering from the information that is presented. This arti-
cle refers to these sources of information as “harm proxies.” The reviewed per-
secution decisions demonstrate that courts do not assess these proxies consist-
ently, which can contribute to the divergent outcomes. In some cases, the courts 
tie the severity of harm to whether the applicant sought medical treatment, 
while other cases do not.389 Then, when courts do assess the medical treatment, 
their perceptions of the significance of the treatment vary considerably. Courts 
have found that a need to obtain stitches demonstrates significant injury, but 
other cases have reached the opposite conclusion.390 The proxies for measuring 
psychological harm are equally divergent. Although several courts opine that 
death threats are sufficiently severe, others determine that such threats are usu-
ally not enough.391 Some decisions discount the relevance of threats that are not 
“imminent,”392 whereas other decisions recognize the residual suffering that an 
                                                        
387  See Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is the details that reveal the 
severity of the particular situation.”). 
388  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 3. 
389  Compare Ouk v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2007) (minimizing an incident where 
the applicant was beaten unconscious because he did not seek medical treatment), with Quan 
v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining that the facts compelled a 
finding of persecution even though the applicant did not seek medical treatment). 
390  Compare Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] cut requiring seven 
stitches is doubtless a substantial injury . . . .”), with Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 730 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“His resultant injuries do not appear to have been severe: he testified that he 
required only stitches and bed rest.”). 
391  Compare Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The determination that ac-
tions rise to the level of persecution is very fact-dependent, though threats of violence and 
death are enough.” (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2000))), with 
Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]hreats alone are typically insufficient 
. . . .”). 
392  Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 922 (7th Cir. 2010). 
15 NEV. L.J. 142 - REMPELL.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:55 PM 
200 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:142 
“ominous” threat can cause over a longer period of time.393 On occasion, courts 
discount psychological harm when no physical harm accompanies it.394 
Courts’ reliance on several of these harm proxies is misguided. For exam-
ple, the suffering caused by psychological harm does not cease to exist because 
physical harm does not accompany it. Adjudicators are not at liberty to dis-
count psychological harm simply because mental suffering is harder to quantify 
than physical harm.395 For other harm proxies, such as the significance of med-
ical treatment generally, or stitches specifically, adjudicators must apply them 
more cautiously. Many factors, including an applicant’s financial circumstanc-
es, may render unfeasible any attempt to obtain medical treatment. Moreover, 
certain serious medical ailments may not require formal treatment to heal, 
while applicants could choose to seek professional assistance for incidents that 
are less severe.396 
D. Ambiguous Basis for Remand 
Throughout this study’s case assessment process, it became apparent that 
several circuit panels supported their persecution determinations by citing or 
analogizing to prior cases that did not hold what the deciding court believed the 
prior case held.397 To illustrate, the Seventh Circuit at times has interpreted its 
decision in Asani v. INS398 to stand for an example of a flawed decisionmaking 
process,399 while other cases imply that Asani established a particular set of 
facts that compelled the conclusion that the applicant was persecuted.400 Hold-
ing that a set of facts compels a finding of persecution can significantly impact 
what it means to be persecuted within a circuit’s jurisdiction. Appellate courts 
should ensure that their opinions leave no room for future courts, agencies, or 
                                                        
393  Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To live, day after day, 
knowing that government forces might secretly arrest and execute you is itself a form of 
mental anguish that can constitute persecution.”). 
394  Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing a definition of persecution 
that requires “punishment” or “personal[] harm[]”). 
395  Several of the decisions that minimize psychological harm justify their conclusions by 
pointing to burden of proof concerns. See, e.g., Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
396  For example, an applicant who sustains a jolt to the head that causes concussive symp-
toms may forsake medical treatment, while an applicant who sustains a gash caused by mod-
erate contact may seek out a medical professional. 
397  In Fedunyak v. Gonzales, for example, the Ninth Circuit assessed whether the assailants 
harmed the applicant because of a protected ground. Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 1126, 
1129 (9th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit subsequently cited Fedunyak to illus-
trate a set of facts that can be construed as compelling a finding of persecution. Ahmed v. 
Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007). 
398  Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 1998). 
399  Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2007); Vladimirova v. Ashcroft, 377 
F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2004). 
400  Irasoc v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2008); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 
732, 738 (7th Cir. 2005); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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litigants to misconstrue the meaning of their persecution decisions. When find-
ing error in EOIR’s persecution assessments, courts should state unambiguous-
ly whether they are remanding the case for decisionmaking flaws or because 
they believe the record compels the conclusion that assailants persecuted the 
applicant. Otherwise, the body of factual circumstances that necessarily qualify 
as persecutory will remain unclear, and subsequent circuit panels’ ability to 
construe the decision in multiple ways will continue to exacerbate the outcome 
discrepancies. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have noted that “[p]ersecution is a 
concept only too readily filled by the latest examples of one person’s inhumani-
ty to another, [so] little purpose is served by attempting to list all its known 
measures.”401 Influenced by this conventional wisdom, perhaps, the Board “has 
eschewed the articulation of rigid rules for determining when mistreatment 
sinks to the level of persecution, preferring instead to treat the issue on an ad 
hoc, case-by-case basis.”402 While the premise for taking an “I know it when I 
see it”403 approach is well-grounded, the effect it has produced on applicants’ 
claims is unfortunate. This article has demonstrated that, aside from limited ar-
eas of agreement, appellate court determinations regarding what it means to be 
persecuted diverge considerably. The appellate courts have now adjudicated 
thousands of asylum claims, and many more cases have passed through immi-
gration agencies. With a clearer understanding of how and why the case out-
comes are so inconsistent, decisionmakers have an opportunity to reassess their 
modus operandi, and infuse greater consistency and fairness into a system in 
desperate need of both. 
                                                        
401  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 93–94 (3d ed. 
2007). 
402  Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005). 
403  Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2011). 
